

DOMESTIC OPERATIONS:

Canadian Army Perspectives



33 Canadian Brigade Group

FOREWORD

33 Canadian Brigade Group's Professional Development seminar for 2005 examined the subject of domestic operations. There are a number of significant reasons for this, the most obvious of which is recent localised events in North America and elsewhere. These incidents have caused a resurgence of interest in domestic activities and a revision of applicable contingency plans. However, from my perspective the most important motivation to properly prepare our units to conduct domestic operations is simply that we are the response of last resort. We provide a critical level of support to our communities when they are in need, and as citizen soldiers it is necessary that we be prepared to lend a hand to our neighbours and families in times of crisis. It behooves us to be ready to help and to expect the unexpected.

Members of 33 Brigade must always be ready to act in support of domestic operations. Domestic operations are normally conducted in response to requests from outside the Canadian Forces and whenever possible a mission specific assessment will be issued prior to the commitment of any support. However, be vigilant and aware of possible local needs because the number of possibilities is infinite. There are two primary contingencies that we are chiefly concerned with. First, there may be a humanitarian disaster, natural or man-made, the magnitude of which overwhelms both the municipal and provincial capacity to manage the situation. Second, there could be a disturbance of the peace, the extent of which overcomes provincial and federal law enforcement authorities. While both are possible the former, rather than the latter, is the norm.

Humanitarian emergency response in Ontario remains the responsibility of the provincial authorities and we must always be cognizant that we are subordinate to the authority of local officials. To that end it is necessary that units of 33 Brigade make efforts to liaise with and know local officials with whom they will interact in the event of local emergency. Also, we must understand and master the intricacies of domestic operations. To that end, these proceedings from the Domestic Operations Professional Development Weekend, augmented by some additional material, have been provided. I strongly encourage you to read, to learn and to actively pursue the intellectual tools to respond effectively when the call for assistance does come. To paraphrase George Orwell, our communities sleep well at night because we are prepared to respond decisively on their behalf. Don't let them down.

FORTES SOLI—FORTIORES UNA

Colonel C.J. Ross
Commander
33 Canadian Brigade Group

PREFACE

Captain Bob Martyn, Editor

Domestic Operations have been a recurring theme in Canadian military history since the raising of the first local militia units to maintain security. Initially, this was the primary function for which Canadian soldiers trained—providing protection for the community. While the threat was seen primarily as coming from our American neighbours, the militia was called out almost routinely to deal with village emergencies such as fires or floods. There was the occasional local uprising to quell, but on the whole, soldiers trained for war but provided a cohesive group of personnel to reduce the severity of their district's calamities.

This reality is hardly a matter of passing interest to historians. But over the past few years, there has been a growing acknowledgement of the Canadian military's extensive involvement in Domestic Operations. The Army has averaged one major Domestic Operation per year since 1998, running the gamut from fighting forest fires to providing security at international summits like the G8 or APEC. The government has clearly indicated that this trend is going to increase. In the Defence section of the recent International Policy Statement, there is a call for a new emphasis on the "defence of Canada, our airspace and maritime approaches, including the protection of Canadian interests in the North."¹

Adding physical substance to this government vision has been the creation of Canada Command as the CF organization from which all domestic operations will be commanded. Its first commander, Vice-Admiral Forcier, proclaimed this contribution towards a more relevant and effective CF as "recognition that Canadians deserve at home the same quality of planning and response to protect them and their interests, as we deliver overseas."² If such a capability is available to the government, they are certainly going to use it. That capability includes the Reserves being called upon in traditional roles as well as with more diverse, unconventional responsibilities.

Several noteworthy changes are in the works for Canada's Reserves. While most commentators focus upon the widely publicized expansion of the Reserves by 3,000 personnel, the CF has quietly begun designating Community-based Contingency Planning Officers (CCPO) for local liaisons. There are also further initiatives regarding improving response capabilities through higher readiness and developing certain specialized competences within certain units. More details on these transformations are available in

Major Walsh's article, "CF Domestic Operations—A National Overview," which follows this Preface.

All Primary Reservists have a liability to serve on Domestic Operations through being placed on Active Service. This is authorized by order of the Governor in Council during emergencies, for the defence of Canada, or as a consequence of actions taken by Canada within the context of any collective defence agreement, such as NORAD or NATO. While any sub-components, units, or personnel are subject to call out by the Minister of National Defence or his designate for emergency service, an Order in Council authorizing such a call out may also be issued if the crisis is of a lesser scale.³ It should be noted that the Canadian Rangers and Cadet Instructor Cadre might be exempt from such Universality of Service provisions in the future, which will affect their liability for Active Service. Nevertheless, all CF soldiers, Regular and Reserve, are therefore obligated to maintain professional competence in their chosen field.

Training today's Army for combat operations only, without considering the requirements of Domestic Operations, is based on the flawed premise that war-fighting skills will suffice for conducting non-combat operations. Such thinking fails to recognize the complex and specific skills required in Operations Other Than War. That this premise continues, despite Canada's extensive experience in lower-intensity missions throughout the Cold War and beyond, must be attributed largely to the fact that Domestic Operations are simply not as "sexy" as soldiers' warrior self-imagery.

To alter this mindset therefore requires effective leadership. While soldiers discussing Domestic Operations have been heard to grumble "I didn't join to fill sandbags or shovel snow," the inevitable reality is that mission success remains the primary objective of all leaders, at all ranks, at all times. Clearly, the one mission that is of growing importance for all members of the Canadian Forces is domestic security.

Increased capability will come with the required leadership and training. As noted by Lieutenant-Colonel Shane Brennan, this is not to suggest reducing the Army's combat capability or training, but merely to implement a policy that includes domestic operations training. Put simply, regularly training soldiers to respond to domestic operations will provide Canadians with a more effective Army ready to respond to the inevitable natural and man-made disasters, internal security threats, and upheaval that strikes all nations in the course of time.

It is therefore clear that all members of the CF must be ready to respond to Canada's needs—an obligation that comes with wearing the uniform as well

as the inherent human desire to help others in crisis. Soldiers must be prepared to respond with the specific skills necessary for the difficult and complicated taskings Domestic Operations will produce. The essays in this volume are the edited compilations of presentations made at a professional development symposium, sponsored by 33 Canadian Brigade Group, to address the growing prevalence of Domestic Operations. Although the audience was primarily Reservists, the policies and explanations herein are relevant to all members of the Canadian Forces. To assist in developing the capability to respond effectively to Canadians in emergency situations, this volume provides relevant perspectives towards understanding Domestic Operations within a Canadian context. National-level and doctrinal particulars will set the stage for the detailed insights on Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical capabilities, as well as Army Lessons Learned. Civilian experts will then provide a similar view from the strategic perspective of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada to the tactical-level experiences of Toronto. The volume will then conclude with some thoughtful academic pieces, written by CF leaders based upon their practical Domestic Operations experiences.

ENDNOTES

1. International Policy Statement. April 2005. Online.
<http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/reports/dps>: 16–20. Accessed 20 April 2005.
2. CF/DND News Release, “Canadian Forces Begin Transformation: Commander of Canada Command and Stand-up Date Announced” NR–05.052—June 28, 2005. Online http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=1691. Accessed 29 June 2005.
3. For a further explanation of these requirements, see “Annex C—Reserve Force Liability to Serve,” DCDS Direction for Domestic Operations (DDDO). Ottawa: DND, April 2005: C-1/1. Available online via http://dcds.mil.ca/cosj3/ndcc/contops/pages/gendocs_e.asp.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

FOREWORD	i
PREFACE	iii
CF DOMESTIC OPERATIONS: A NATIONAL OVERVIEW	1
<i>Major Jerry Walsh</i>	
DOMESTIC OPERATIONS: THE DOCTRINE DIMENSION	11
<i>Major R. D. Bradford</i>	
CF JOINT NBCD COMPANY	15
<i>Major Ian C. MacVicar</i>	
DOMESTIC OPERATIONS: LESSONS LEARNED	21
<i>Major Martin Corriveau</i>	
RESPONSE TO NATIONAL SECURITY INCIDENTS: PUBLIC SAFETY EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS	33
<i>Mr Pierre Gagnon</i>	
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ONTARIO	39
<i>Mr Joseph Moore and Mr Dave Clarke</i>	
DOMESTIC OPERATIONS: CITY OF TORONTO	47
<i>Mr Warren Leonard</i>	
TRAIN FOR DOMESTIC OPERATIONS	53
<i>Lieutenant-Colonel Shane Brennan</i>	
TRAINING ON RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR DOMESTIC OPERATIONS	69
<i>Brigadier-General T. J. Grant</i>	
ANNEX A—CONPLAN RAPTOR: LFCA GENERAL PLAN FOR THE CONDUCT OF DOMESTIC OPERATIONS	87
ANNEX B—GLOSSARY	95
CONTRIBUTORS	97

CF DOMESTIC OPERATIONS: A NATIONAL OVERVIEW

Major Jerry Walsh
J3 Continental

I will dispense with any unnecessary rhetoric and launch right into this presentation. It is my intention to present the operational concepts and doctrine of Canadian Forces domestic operations, highlight linkages between the CF and key civilian agencies, and review domestic command and control structures. Although starting with the fundamental position that a Domestic Operation involves a CF response to a request for assistance from Canadian civil authorities, or from the Canadian public, no presentation to a military audience would be complete without an authorized doctrinal definition: what constitutes a domestic operation? Domestic Operations comprise those operations featuring “assistance to Canadian civil authorities or in which the CF figures prominently within the public.” From a strategic perspective, however, one event changed the concept or parameters of CF domestic operations—September 11, 2001.

In the aftermath of those attacks on the USA, the nature of defence and security in North America changed dramatically. All of you will no doubt be familiar with the establishment of United States’ Northern Command, which achieved full operational capability during the fall of 2003. What many of you may not be aware of are the initiatives, both in the fields of defence and enhanced security, which have been developed in the past two years between Canada and the US.

Information sharing at the national level between the National Defence Command Centre (NDCC), on behalf of the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff, and the Domestic Warning Center (DWC) at USNORTHCOM has been a top priority of the CDS and DCDS and has led to the development and refinement of integrated bi-national crisis and consequence management plans. Before getting into the ramifications of these changes, let us review some basic realities.

All of you will be familiar with the principal defence tasks assigned to the CF. The principle Defence roles within Canada are as follows:

Defending Canada, i.e. to supervise and control the activities on our own territory, as well as within the airspace and maritime zones that concern Canada. Defence of Canada also includes answering requests

for assistance of the civil authority, helping other ministries achieve various national goals, ensuring a national search and rescue service and providing robust support in the event of national crisis.

Defending North America in collaboration with the United States, i.e. to protect the Canadian approaches to the continent, in liaison with the United States, particularly via the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD). The CF must also maintain the capacity to carry out maritime, land, and air operations in effective collaboration with the American forces in the defence of the northern half of the Western hemisphere.

Contributing to peace and safety in the world, i.e. to take part in a vast range of multilateral operations carried out under the aegis of the United Nations (UN), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), regional organizations or coalitions of countries holding similar views. The CF will further take part in humanitarian efforts, the restoration of zones devastated by conflicts, and to participate in arms control efforts and other confidence building measures.

In the domestic realm, these defence missions translate into five major commitments: (1) Defence of North America; (2) Maritime Surveillance and Patrolling; (3) Maritime and Aerospace Search and Rescue; (4) Counter-Terrorism; and (5) Support to Civil Authorities—which is the main focus of this presentation. In providing this military support, the CF maintains a reactive posture consisting of Immediate Reaction Units (normally battalion-sized combat arms units), Ready Duty Ships, Standby Aircraft and various Specialist Elements. These represent a spectrum of unique military skills and capabilities, which is meant to be a resource of last resort.

This element of being the government's last resort is one of several challenges inherent in dealing with civil authorities. As noted, the stand-by units are necessarily reactive: they must wait to be requested, normally after all other avenues have proven inadequate or been overwhelmed. Often the authorities do not know what to request, since there is little public knowledge of the Canadian Forces' capabilities or limits of employment, both of which are quite significant. Depending on the mission, there may be jurisdictional problems. For the soldiers, and possibly the military leadership, the change of orientation from war fighting to building protective dikes may prove problematic. Finally, as the crises develop under media and political scrutiny, there may be temptation to call out the military before other civil avenues are expended, negating the edict that the military be the resource of last recourse.

TYPES OF CF SUPPORT

There are numerous types of support to civil operations that CF troops may be called upon to deliver. These span Assistance to Law Enforcement Agencies (ALEA)—whether Federal or Provincial/Territorial, support to Other Government Departments (OGDs), Aid of the Civil Power (ACP), Invocation of the Federal Emergencies Act and Provision of Humanitarian Assistance. We will look at these individually.

Assistance to Law Enforcement Agencies (Federal): Should such an emergency arise, a request for the CF will be made by the Minister responsible for Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada (PSEPC) to the Minister of National Defence. The National Defence Act (Section 273.6 [2], Assistance to Law Enforcement Agencies) allows for support, in the form of ground surveillance, airborne support, NBCD, communications, other specialist support, etc., to be provided. Such support may be requested based upon existing agreements, such as Orders in Council (OIC) covering “CF Assistance to Correctional Services Canada—Federal Penitentiaries,” or various Memoranda of Understanding (MOU), such as “CF/RCMP—Counter-Drug Operations,” or “CF/Dept of Fisheries—Surveillance/Enforcement.”

Assistance to Law Enforcement (Provincial/Territorial): In this instance, a request for facilities, equipment, or personnel is made from the requisite Provincial or Territorial Minister, usually the Solicitor-General to the Canadian Forces. The authority for such a request lies in an Order in Council—“Canadian Forces Assistance to Provincial Police Forces Directives,” or CFAPPF. The level of command within the CF empowered to approve such requests varies with the degree of hazard:

Classes of Support

CLASS 1—Requires MND approval. The Minister’s consent is required whenever a disturbance of the peace is occurring or may occur, and when CF personnel or operational equipment is requested.

CLASS 2—An Operational-level Commander may authorize CF support if a disturbance of the peace occurring or may occur, but the civil authorities require only non-operational equipment.

CLASS 3—Operational-level Commander may consent to provide assistance in situations with no potential for disturbance of the peace, and where there is no requirement for CF personnel and/or operational or non-operational equipment.

CLASS 4—This is the lowest possible level authorized within the Provision of Services Policy. It covers support to provincial law enforcement authorities for other than law enforcement operations, including CF personnel, operational and/or non-operational equipment, such as the use of firing ranges, training areas and other infrastructure facilities.

Support to Other Government Departments: Support requests come generally from below ministerial level to the Minister of National Defence. These requests are for supply of services for events of national importance, such as VIP visits or international sporting events. Unlike Assistance to Law Enforcement Agencies, where the concern is level of hazard, the foremost concern is recovery of costs.

Aid of the Civil Power: These requests for assistance are intended for situations requiring restoration of public order. As such a Provincial Attorney General must generate them. The Chief of the Defence Staff, pursuant to Part VI of the *National Defence Act*, is authorized to commit CF troops and equipment in response.

Federal Emergencies Act:¹ This Act provides for military support in critical situations that exceed provincial capacity, particularly where the health or safety of Canadians are endangered. The Act can also be invoked to preserve sovereignty or in crises threatening national security. As such, it is intended to address emergencies of public welfare, public order, international crises and war. For the CF to deploy within Canada under the auspices of the *Emergencies Act*, the action must be of limited duration, and the province must consent to federal action.

Humanitarian Assistance: Any Federal, Provincial/Territorial, or Municipal Official can request this support of the Canadian Forces. The three predominant categories are emergency civil assistance (natural and human-induced disasters), search for missing persons (Ground Search and Rescue), or other humanitarian assistance. Under section 273.6 (1) ["Public Service"] of the *National Defence Act*, the Provision of Services Policy applies—subject, again, to cost recovery.

CF CRISIS RESPONSE—PROCESSES AND CAPABILITIES

With the various levels of command and disparate headquarters within Canada, how might Canada respond to a specific crisis, such as a terrorist threat?² To answer this question, let us examine a sample scenario. Intelligence reports have indicated a group of terrorists may be attempting to destroy or at least damage the port facilities in Halifax using a ship, possibly as a weapon.

The RCMP and other agencies responsible for security rapidly conclude that meeting this threat will require the assistance of the Canadian Forces. The matter is referred to the Solicitor General who concurs and formally asks the Minister of National Defence to authorize the CF to assist the RCMP in this matter. Upon being advised by the Chief of the Defence Staff that the CF can provide the form of assistance requested, the Minister agrees and authorizes military support.

As this threat is sea-borne, the CDS appoints the Commander of Maritime Forces Atlantic as commander of the Joint Task Force (Comd JTF) stood up to meet this threat. After approval of his Concept of Operations, Comd JTF receives his Rules of Engagement, following which the necessary maritime, air and land resources are then transferred to the JTF for employment. Unless the government directs otherwise, the RCMP would remain the responsible agency, with the CF in support. The operation would conclude when the RCMP no longer requires military assistance.

Note that this command and control relationship does not change the legal authority and responsibility for command within the Canadian Forces. The Chief of Defence Staff commands all CF operations. The Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff's role equates to that of the senior operations officer for the Canadian Forces. Deployed forces are therefore commanded by the CDS through the DCDS, wherein you will find the Chief of Staff Operations (COS J3). The Environmental Chiefs of Staff do not command deployed forces. Rather, they are mainly responsible for force generation, force development, and specific routine operations. At subordinate Operational/Tactical levels, the commanders act as the CDS' representatives to their respective provincial/territorial governments and key civil agencies. As such, their role is quite often that of effecting liaison and educating civilian authorities on the military's capabilities, strengths and limitations.

Some of the limitations necessitate commanders seeking guidance prior to deployment, if only because cautions and restraints are modified frequently. Because of this changing nature, details will not be spelled out here, merely listed in order to initiate thought. For example, while Intelligence support is integral to military operations, the issue of intelligence gathering within a domestic environment is a troublesome issue. Also problematic are domestic situations requiring direct CF support to Law Enforcement, particularly in tasks that may necessitate crowd confrontation or the granting of peace officer status. The provision of Health Services also crosses several regulatory bodies, which may prove problematic. Finally, there are economic considerations: the CF must not be seen to compete with industry or local agencies that could provide the type of service

requested from the military, and, as always, commanders cannot neglect those situations where there is a requirement to recover financial costs.

CANADIAN FORCES' SPECIALIST CAPABILITIES

While virtually every member of the CF can be called upon to support domestic operations, there are a number of specialized units of which Commanders should be aware. These can be called upon to augment your tasking, or it may prove merely beneficial to be aware of their resources in case one is called upon to educate civilian authorities on CF capabilities.

Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART): This unit retains the specialized capability to respond to natural disasters and complex humanitarian emergencies (water, medical, engineering expertise). Although originally envisioned to be employed on international relief operations (e.g. earthquakes, hurricanes), a DART Enhancement Project is currently underway to expand the domestic role of the DART.

Joint NBCD Company:³ This Company's primary mission is to respond to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear emergencies. Initially this was envisaged as being in support of law enforcement agencies, such as the RCMP, however their role is expanding through their inclusion in the CF's Special Operations Group. Their immediate response component is on two-hours notice-to-move (NTM), followed by a reinforced component on four hours NTM. Their functions include the provision of specialist advice, hazard detection, fallout and contamination prediction and the collection of contamination samples. While the unit retains a casualty extraction and decontamination capability, this is for emergency first-responders only; no mass casualty decontamination capability is held or presently planned.

Nuclear Emergency Response Team(s) (NERT): One team is located on each coast, in Halifax, NS and Esquimalt, BC. Their mandate is to support visits of other navies' Nuclear Powered Vessels (NPV) and respond to maritime nuclear emergencies. They are held at a very high readiness.

Search and Rescue (SAR): The CF maintains Search and Rescue Squadrons at five Wings across Canada, each of which hold a 30-minute response stand-by during normal working hours and two hours otherwise. The SAR Techs are trained and equipped to enter crash sites by methods varying from free-fall parachute to scuba diving, in virtually any weather, in order to stabilize, render emergency medical treatment and evacuate trauma victims. Four Joint Rescue Coordination Centres support this tasking, in addition to the small rescue units located at the Fighter Wings located across Canada.

CF Major Air Disaster (MAJAD): Approximately 150 personnel are tasked to respond to the crash of a major commercial aircraft in a remote area of Canada. Capable of parachute insertion into a crash site, these personnel consist primarily of medical personnel and combat arms soldiers for camp support duties.

Joint Operations Group (JOG): The JOG mission is to provide a rapidly deployable, joint operational-level command and control capability for domestic and international missions. They are envisaged as deploying a Joint Task Force Headquarters, with an integral signals capability, within 48 hours. Their role is to plan and conduct international and domestic operations across the spectrum of conflict—warfighting to humanitarian assistance operations.

PLANNING AND CONDUCT OF DOMESTIC OPERATIONS

Recent DND/CF announcements to strengthen Public Safety and Security are currently having an impact upon CF operations. Within the Special Operations Group, Joint Task Force 2 (JTF-2) is having its various capabilities expanded and improved. As well, there are enhancements to the DART's domestic response capability. CF holdings of nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) medical countermeasures and improving maintenance of existing counter-measures stock are ongoing. The CF has improved the provision of training, advice and technological support to Canadian first-responders and other government departments. Finally, enhancements to signals intelligence and computer network defence are on going.

There are several significant changes in the works for Canada's Reserves. In addition to the widely publicized expansion of the Reserves by 3,000 personnel, overwhelmingly within the Army, the CF has begun designating Community-based Contingency Planning Officers (CCPO) from the Reserve Force to work with local officials to facilitate inclusion of military support in the development of emergency plans.

Amongst the initiatives currently being studied by the Chief of the Land Staff and Land Forces Reserve Restructuring are 1) directing Reserve units to maintain high readiness elements capable of responding on short notice to domestic humanitarian crises; and 2) developing the capability of selected Reserves units to assist first responders in a coordinated reaction to domestic CBRN incidents. These initiatives are intended to complement existing Canadian Forces domestic capabilities such as Immediate Reaction Units (IRUs), ready duty ships, stand-by aircraft and specialist capabilities such as JTF-2, the Joint NBCD Company and the Maritime NERTs.

INTELLIGENCE SHARING AND OTHER CHALLENGES IDENTIFIED IN RECENT OPERATIONS

A significant amount of work has been done within a variety of headquarters within Canada (primarily the Maritime Staff) and in concert with US counterparts to develop a bi-national common operating picture. Many challenges have been identified during the development of this maritime picture, not the least of which are the sensitivities of sharing information and intelligence between Canadian and US, military and civilian, headquarters.

The frequency and scale of integrated, joint, and combined domestic and continental civil-military operations in which the CF will become involved in the future has highlighted the requirement for a close examination of domestic Command and Control structures and a C4ISR-enabled common operating picture.⁴ The growing number and complexity of what had previously been accepted as “routine” domestic operations now demands that greater situational awareness be maintained at the strategic level. Indeed, the definition of routine (or limited) and contingency (or complex) domestic operations must be reviewed, as the examples following will illustrate.

The summer of 2003 marked the most severe forest fire season in British Columbia’s recorded history. Abnormally hot, dry weather resulted in over 2,500 wildfires burning over a vast area, mostly in the interior of the province. Interface fires, which occur in locations where wild lands meet urban development, resulted in the destruction of over 334 homes and businesses, and led to the evacuation of close to 45,000 citizens. At its zenith, Op PEREGRINE, the CF response to the of British Columbian government’s request for assistance, amounted to over 2,200 soldiers, sailors and air force personnel from across Canada. CF personnel were primarily employed in “mopping up” operations, allowing experienced civilian fire fighters to focus their efforts on front line operations. CF aviation assets (4 x CH-146 *Griffon*) proved crucial to the operation, allowing CF personnel to rapidly re-locate as well as providing aerial damage assessment, liaison, and emergency medical evacuation.

Hurricane Juan provides another illustration. This Category 2 hurricane made landfall between Prospect and Peggy’s Cove, Nova Scotia around 12:15 a.m. on 29 September. With winds raging at 158 km/h—the worst hurricane winds to strike the Halifax region since 1893—it took three hours for Juan to tear north through the middle of mainland Nova Scotia. Although it lost speed along the way, hurricane-force winds were maintained throughout its passage. Two people were killed when trees fell on their vehicles. Power lines tumbled to the streets, smashing property and leaving

about 300,000 homes and businesses without power. Three people subsequently died in a house fire, likely started with a candle during the power outage. The Halifax Regional Municipality's Mayor, supported by Emergency Measures Organization, Nova Scotia, requested assistance from LFAA with the removal of fallen trees and debris, as well as the provision of a field kitchen.

Using these examples to summarize this presentation, a commander must consider carefully the nature of assistance requested: is the task clearly defined? To facilitate the Operational Planning Process, inter-departmental/agency cooperation with a recognizable lead agency must be known and accepted right from the beginning. Parameters for employment of CF resources must be established early, particularly given the aforementioned constraints on Assistance to Law Enforcement Agencies (ALEA) and the provision of Health Services. Because mission creep is often inevitable, expectations of CF capabilities must be managed carefully. As requests escalate quickly, knowing and following procedures and proper authorizations makes the provision of CF support simpler and more effective.

ENDNOTES

1. The Emergency Act replaced the War Measures Act in July 1988. It was under this original Act (enacted 22 August 1914), that the Canadian Army was called out in support of the Trudeau government during the 1970 FLQ “October Crisis.” (ed.)
2. This multiplicity of commands and headquarters is being addressed. See “Defence: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World” within the Government’s April 2005 International Policy Statement. Available online www.forces.gc.ca/site/reports/dps/highlights. (ed.)
3. For more details on this unit, see “CF Joint NBCD Company,” within this volume.
4. C4ISR stands for Command, Control, Communications, and Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance. In the most extreme permutation of this growing acronym, and American presentation once added a second “I” for Information, and ended with “FTW,” to specify that this construct was “For the Warfighter.” (Ed.)

DOMESTIC OPERATIONS: THE DOCTRINE DIMENSION

Major R.D. Bradford

Canada and her military have a long history of domestic operations, which have ranged from ameliorating natural disasters, such as the 1950 Red River flood, to armed Aid of the Civil Power tasks, such as the 1976 Olympics. The ultimate preparedness for domestic operations was during the air-atomic era of 1948–1964, when National Survival directives drove contingency planning.

This was followed by a “hibernation era” of domestic operations wherein NATO operations, led by 4 CMBG in Europe, took precedence in military consciousness. This too changed with the collapse of the Warsaw Pact in the 1990s. While there was a civilian outcry for military spending cuts as part of a “peace dividend,” demands for CF support at home increased concurrently. These covered the spectrum from flooding in Saguenay and Winnipeg to the crash of Swissair flight 111 off of Nova Scotia.

In all of these instances, the military adhered to two basic principles: the CF is a force of last resort, and that deployed, military personnel must be flexible and adaptive to changing requirements. The domestic situation altered significantly with the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, in that potential disaster responses have now combined with, or been instigated by, hostile action. Has CF doctrine kept pace with the changing environment?

What Domestic Operations doctrine as did exist during the Cold War followed a rough adaptive principle—soldiers who are disciplined and trained to fight wars could just as readily adapt to lower scale exertions, such as peacekeeping or domestic crises. There was a long-standing legal basis to support this view, as enshrined in the Aid of the Civil Authority clauses of the *National Defence Act*. Corporate memory, however, has eroded, and lessons learned have faded.

The major doctrinal guidance to date has been provided by the acronym-laden tomes DCDS 2/98, DDDO, and IAHDO.¹ NDHQ Instruction DCDS 2/98, “Guidance for the Conduct of Domestic Operations” was promulgated 10 July 1998, with periodic updates since. It explains policies regarding provincial/territorial civil disaster relief, assistance to law enforcement, planning and operational guidance, training and force generation and relevant administrative concepts.

For operational purposes, this information has been expanded dramatically through the April 2005 *DCDS Directions for Domestic Operations*, or “DDDO.”² This document acknowledges the changed environment and the increasing likelihood of CF involvement on domestic operations. This book provides much relevant direction, including on potentially troublesome issues such as intelligence operations, employment of reservists, reservists under 18 years of age and CBRN guidance.

Finally, the *Inter-Agency Handbook on Domestic Operations* is primarily a catalogue of the relevant departments and agencies with which the CF will inevitably work during crises, including key non-governmental organizations.³ The IAHO complements the DDDO and the “National Support Plan,” a document created by Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada. The IAHO outlines the Federal-level organizational structure and concept of operations. It was written for commanders and staff at the strategic- and operational-level. It is a “living publication,” in that because the information changes faster than production cycles, the document is maintained on electronic format.

With these three documents, why would the CF require additional Domestic Operations doctrine? The personnel of NDHQ’s Directorate Of Plans, Doctrine, & Training have been tasked with producing *Joint Doctrine for Domestic Operations (JDDO)* in order to provide broad governing principles and a general framework. In the hierarchical categorization, *JDDO* is “authoritative,” *DDDO* is “directive,” and *IAHO* is “informative.”

Essentially, the *JDDO* addresses the “forest,” leaving the “trees” to the *DDDO* and the various Operational Plans and Contingency Plans. Such a general overview is necessary for initial awareness of, and orientation to, the complex issues of domestic operations. This makes it suitable for varied audiences, such as non-military personnel and for general professional development, such as Canadian Forces College or various military schools. Further, high-level doctrine provides for general stability over time while allowing detailed adjustments. It provides a referent marker for detailed work in subordinate documents and a common start point for expansion by doctrine writers within the various environmental commands.

It is intended that this work will cover ground similar to currently available publications, but with greater applicability to joint operations. Some of the topics covered will therefore include standing governmental and CF arrangements, such as command and control relationships, civilian support requests, and the operational approach and any special aspects of public interface to be taken by the CF. As well, regulations on provision of services, force generation and personnel policy as well as requisite key

legislation and federal government emergency plans will be included for easy reference.

While the *JDDO* is intended to be the authoritative capstone joint document, this is not to say that it will remain a fixed publication. Future challenges will ensure its fluidity; issues will include shifting paradigms, such as the context for “domestic operations” within cross-border incidents, or the possibility of the actual meaning of domestic operations changing over time. Regardless, two challenges will definitely remain in the near term. These are the increasingly obvious pressures of compressed time and urgent demand, coupled with a lack of subject matter expertise. Domestic operations will remain a significant focus for CF troops. Assisting in the planning and conduct of these operations will be several cardinal products: *DCDS Direction for Domestic Operations*, *Inter-Agency Handbook For Domestic Operations*, *The Conduct of Land Operations: Operational Level Doctrine for the Canadian Army*, and the forthcoming *Joint Doctrine for Domestic Operations*.⁴

ENDNOTES

1. Canada, NDHQ Instruction DCDS 2/98, "Guidance for the Conduct of Domestic Operations." Online <http://armyonline.kingston.mil.ca/LFAA/D27647.asp>. Accessed 15 May 2005.
2. Canada, DCDS Direction for Domestic Operations. Online <http://armyonline.kingston.mil.ca/LFCA/D143000440039082.asp?Lng=E>. Accessed 15 May 2005.
3. Canada, DND, B-GJ-005-308/FP-010, Inter-Agency Handbook on Domestic Operations. May 2005. Online http://www.forces.gc.ca/dcds/jointdoc/j7doc_home_e.asp. Accessed 15 May 2005.
4. While B-GL-300-001/FP-000, *The Conduct of Land Operations, Operational Level Doctrine for the Canadian Army*, 1997, has not been discussed within this article, it remains critical for understanding Army domestic operations doctrine. See especially, chapter 7, "Operations Other than War."

CF JOINT NBCD COMPANY

Major Ian C. MacVicar

While a Canadian Forces nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) Response Team has existed since 1976, the Chief of Review Services' 2000 report separated the CF Nuclear, Biological Chemical School and the NBC Response Team. Then, as a result of the events of 11 September 2001, the federal government directed the CF to expedite the enhancement of its current capability to respond to terrorist threats or incidents involving NBC weapons or agents. To achieve this, the NBCD portion of the National Military Support Capability project was moved and expanded as a stand-alone project.

The Statement of Requirements establishing the unit indicated that it would be a high-readiness strategic asset, responsive to domestic or international crises, minus Search & Rescue and disaster relief operations. As such, it benefited from VCDS Priority 1 manning status. Domestic chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) counter-terrorism operations would predominate its planning and training focus, which led it to continual interaction with other governmental departments and agencies.

In a separate asymmetric threat study, conducted on behalf of the Office of Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness (OCIPEP), it was noted that the military's NBCD capability could provide command guidance, hazard avoidance, force protection, and contamination control. These capabilities are resident in the CF Joint NBCD Company.

While all members are prepared to conduct land ops, the unit draws its personnel from 23 military occupations spanning the three service elements. The unit's readiness posture and expected tasks require unique individuals. The high aerobic and strength demands require personnel who are physically fit. They must also be intelligent in order to understand basic CBRN science and in using the many different, highly technical detection and identification tools. Finally, they must be highly motivated, given the long courses, physically demanding work, and the social restrictions ("short leash and alcohol limits") inherent in the high- to very high-readiness demands of rapid employability. The interaction with First Responder community and CF specialists, however, makes it very rewarding work for the Company members.

CF JNBCD Company's role is to provide General Support NBCD to any CF

Joint Task Force established to conduct Domestic Operations, to Naval Nuclear Emergency Response Teams, to other DND operations (e.g. Nuclear Emergency Response), and other government departments for restoration operations or crisis consequence management. The Company provides select Close Support NBCD services to domestic and international operations, specifically in supporting the Dwyer Hill Training Centre. The Company has recently been deployed domestically in support of the Ontario Provincial Police Emergency Response Team EOD operations and chemical warfare agent range clearance, in addition to DRDC research projects.

Internationally, the unit has provided Environmental and Industrial Health Hazard Support for deployments to Afghanistan, Haiti, and the Golan Heights. Such deployments have been either planned, such as supporting the G8 Conference, or no-notice, such as investigating a suspicious package at CFB Trenton.

The no-notice call-outs generally occur in accordance with the National Counter-Terrorism Plan. When a CBRN incident is beyond municipal and/or provincial capabilities, the Provincial Attorney-General would request CF assistance, via Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada (Solicitor-General) to the Minister of National Defence. The National Defence Command Centre's J3 NBC would then contact the CO of JNBCD who would deploy the requisite troops.

The unit's Immediate Response Component (IRC), consisting of 5 to 6 personnel, is on 4 hours notice to move (NTM). They would facilitate liaison with the civilian Unified Command Post and other governmental departments, in order to assess the situation and recommend any further CF response. The IRC makes its assessment based largely through liaison, plus a reconnaissance detachment with its hand-carried detection equipment. Also included are a decontamination representative for Fire Department/HAZMAT ("Hazardous Materials") liaison for issues of emergency decontamination only, and a Physician's Assistant for medical counter-measures and local medical liaison.

The Reinforcing Response Component (RRC) is on 8 hours NTM. It expands upon the IRC's capabilities, bringing additional C4I, decontamination, reconnaissance and surveillance support. The Sustaining Response Component (SRC) is planned at 12 hours NTM, and provides for reinforcements from each sub-unit. It permits sustainment of initial forces by pushing forward requisite supplies and reinforcing personnel. While the SRC has not yet been tasked by DCDS, it has been exercised successfully several times.

These sections collectively make the JNBCD Coy the military component of the National CBRN Response Team, in concert with the RCMP Explosives Disposal and Technology Section, RCMP Forensic Identification Research Services and the Public Health Agency of Canada's National Microbiology Lab/Office for Laboratory Security. While the JNBCD Coy is located in Trenton, it draws upon scientific support from DRDC Suffield (Chemical, Biological issues) and DRDC Ottawa (Radiological issues).¹

The previously mentioned Environmental and Industrial Health Hazard Support for international deployments can include specialist NBCD advice to the commander of a Joint Task Force. The JNBCD Coy provides a wide spectrum of NBCD support during theatre activation, initial deployments, and theatre closure support for up to 1500 Combatant Components for international deployment. Augmentation will be required from Force Generators to support such deployments beyond the first troop rotation. Such expansion sees Primary Augmentation of 48 positions at 21 days NTM being assigned from various Force Generators. Follow-on General Augmentation has been identified at 211 personnel at 90–180 days NTM.

So what do these people actually do? Their tasks can be broken down into three broad categories: contingency planning, crisis management and consequence management. In addition to developing international and domestic contingency plans, and establishing relevant tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs), the unit conducts DCDS-directed trials of concepts and equipment—this, on top of conducting JNBCD Coy continuation training. The normal routine also includes liaison with military, security, government, and health agencies throughout the world. Crisis Management involves removing or neutralizing the threat before the release of contamination affects Canadian citizens, whereas Consequence Management aims at limiting the spread of, and removing or neutralizing, any contamination following release. This involves providing advice on CBRN defensive measures to mitigate effects on the local population and response personnel. Providing such advice requires liaison in acquiring and interpreting ground level meteorological information for downwind hazard prediction.

The unit also affords secure access to latest military intelligence on CBRN terrorist threats and to CBRN defence scientific and technical information. This allows for detecting the presence, origin, and positive identification of threat agents or radioactive sources. Their expertise is such that they can conduct Sampling and Identification of Biological, Chemical and Radiological Agents (SIBCRA) for use as forensic evidence, as well as provide medical countermeasures for the National CBRN Response Team. The unit

coordinates and advises an emergency's On Scene Commander/Nuclear Emergency Commander (NEC). Finally, the JNBCD Coy offers radiation and decontamination capabilities

The future of the JNBCD Coy looks no less hectic. Planning is ongoing to expand the personnel establishment by 50 percent. This could be tied in with the unit being integrated with the CF's recently announced Special Operations Group. The current and forecast security environment indicates the high activity tempo is likely to be maintained—NBC can no longer stand for "No Body Cares."

ENDNOTES

1. Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC) evolved from the earlier Defence Research Establishments and the Defence and Civil Institute for Environmental Medicine.

DOMESTIC OPERATIONS: LESSONS LEARNED

Major Martin Corriveau

The Army Lessons Learned Centre (ALLC) collects and analyzes information on Canadian and allied operational and training experiences for dissemination as lessons. This is done in order to improve the overall operational capability of the Canadian Army. This essay stems from that mandate by providing an overview of the major lessons ascertained from recent domestic operations and exercises.

The Canadian Land Forces' role in domestic operations serves to connect with Canadians, as stated in the Army's Strategy, and ensure our relevances in order to remain Land Forces as an institutionally credible entity. Most importantly, our domestic participation ensures Canadians live in a secure, protected environment.

First, this paper will provide a "sales pitch," giving you a brief overview of what the ALLC does for the Army and its soldiers. This will be followed by an examination of the main domestic operations lessons from 1997 forward, notwithstanding having relatively few relevant lessons retained in our database when compared with our international deployments.

The ALLC mission is composed of three primary functions: a collection function, an analysis function and a dissemination function, all of which are limited by a full manning of merely six personnel. Since "full manning" is only a theory, the ALLC concentrates on collection and dissemination. Becoming a learning organization is everybody's business. Without input from soldiers, via post-operation reports and post-exercise reports, the Army cannot collect, analyse and eventually disseminate the observations, trends and lessons to learn from our experiences. Dissemination is accomplished primarily through *Dispatches*, *The Bulletin*, or the online "Lessons Learned Knowledge Warehouse."¹

As you all know, due to its eclectic nature, "domestic operations" covers a large span of mission types, as presented in DCDS 2/98 "Guidance For The Conduct Of Domestic Operations." Domestic operations can vary from humanitarian assistance, such as Op ASSISTANCE, assistance to other governmental departments (OGD), or assistance to law enforcement agencies, for instance Op GRIZZLY. With this in mind, let us examine the major operations as held in the ALLC database.

OP ASSISTANCE (RED RIVER FLOODS—WINNIPEG, 17 APRIL–17 MAY 1997)

1 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group, leading with the Immediate Response Unit from 1 PPCLI, was augmented by 2 CMBG and 5 GBMC resources to support approximately 17,000 civilians that were evacuated from several “ring dike” towns that were completely surrounded by flood water. In all, flooding extended to form a lake 50 kilometres by 30 kilometres in size.

The main strategic/operational lessons centre on the requirement to build cooperation with civil authorities. This necessity is critical prior to, during and after operations. Establishing domestic operation liaison cells within each provincial capital readily facilitates this collaboration. This develops an enhanced degree of understanding of CF responsibilities and capabilities by likely counterparts in potential areas of operations.

Contingency planning for crises accelerates situational awareness, moving key players towards a common understanding. Such planning, when coupled with daily coordination meetings, were a key to pre-empting further crises. By including representation from several layers of government, communities, US officials upriver and the various military components, these meetings produced, in effect, a synchronized Joint Interagency Multinational Public battle rhythm.

Contingency planning also allows for standard operating procedures to be in place to ensure that continuous, 24/7 crisis management is possible. This requires that clear direction from higher headquarters and proper administrative Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) inside respective governments be done prior to, and reviewed regularly during, operations in order to facilitate effective integration of available resources.

At the tactical level, effective decentralized operations are critical. Operating concepts at the company level must match with those of civilian entities. This can be enhanced through liaison teams, detached with integral vehicles and communications. Such liaison officer (LO) teams are a force multiplier for Information Operations, and speeding “battle procedure” with civilians otherwise unfamiliar with military operations. One final point regarding information management is the requirement for someone to conduct the Public Affairs role in connecting to the media. For Op ASSISTANCE, units’ Adjutants were tasked with that responsibility.

OP RECUPERATION (ICE STORM—EASTERN ONTARIO/QUEBEC, 8 JANUARY–8 FEBRUARY 1998)

This operation was the CF mission to assist in recovery following the ice storm that ravaged Ontario and Quebec. The operation took place from 8 January to 8 February 1998, with CF elements deploying to support civil authorities and provide humanitarian assistance across southeastern Ontario and western Quebec.

Op RECUPERATION produced several strategic/operational lessons. The mission was hindered by the late arrival of an incomplete Operations Order. Belated direction resulted in compressed planning processes at area/brigade/unit level. The absence of Rules of Engagement proved worrisome, given the presence of troops in the company of police officials.² Use of Force guidelines must be considered an essential element of any national operation order.

Area and brigade headquarters must conduct contingency planning and training exercises in major urban centres to familiarize troops with operating in such an environment and working with civilian organizations and volunteers. This will be eased through establishing close liaison with all emergency organizations and local municipalities to ensure a better understanding of the CF's limitations and capabilities. It is likely that CIMIC personnel will play a growing role in this field, in that it functions prior to, during and after deployments. While CF personnel shortfalls will likely limit this lesson, it is suggested that headquarters at all levels be established with sufficient G2, G5 and G6 resources to establish and maintain effective links with provincial and regional emergency organizations; this would require establishment reviews at the Chief of the Land Staff level. A final point regarding liaison and operational functions is that the military is in support, not in command—this involves a change in mentality for most leadership personnel.

Finally, areas of operations should be assigned to units based upon regional municipality boundaries. Regular liaison must be maintained with emergency organizations, as well as local and provincial police forces, to ensure that current boundaries are known to all involved.

Op RECUPERATION also produced some administrative lessons relating predominantly to the vital requirement for an arrival assistance group, containing a proper R&D cell, being established early in the deployment. This is due to the large numbers of augmentees from diverse Regular Force units, as well as the Reserves. The increasing likelihood of Reserve deployment on domestic operations calls for a simplified and streamlined

method of accelerating the process of administering Class C contracts; these are required for legal purposes, and their necessity will not simply go away.

At the tactical level units must deploy “topped up” with their complete integral vehicle and radio holdings, including strong consideration of F Echelon vehicles. Consider basic capabilities—fighting vehicles provide ample protection against falling branches, for example. Communications that can be augmented with cell phones or Motorola-type systems, which many units hold, will be a force multiplier. This benefit however must be controlled and used to best advantage.

Media and liaison activities proved essential in better informing civilian entities and improved our own operational efficiency. Media training should be included in unit/Brigade annual professional development programs, as well as in annual training plans. LO training for domestic ops should become a mandatory annual training requirement at unit and brigade levels.

OP MATTOCK (FOREST FIREFIGHTING—NORTHERN ALBERTA, MAY 1998)

This operation saw Land Force Western Area in support of firefighters combating forest and brush fires in Northern Alberta. 1 Service Battalion, with reserve individual augmentees and resources, provided the lion’s share of support, predominantly with respect to the Command and Control structure.

The main strategic/operational lessons stemmed from a reoccurrence of timely decisions being handicapped through the late arrival of higher level direction, which compressed the operational planning process at area/brigade/unit level. As well, Op MATTOCK saw numerous problems in the administration of reservists’ Class C contracts.

At the tactical level there was a recurring problem of units deploying without their complete vehicle and communications holdings. The administrative requirement for the early establishment of a proper R&D cell was also noted within this mission.

OP PREAMBLE (TORONTO SNOW STORM, JANUARY 1999).

Op PREAMBLE saw the Royal Canadian Dragoons, augmented by 130 Reservists from Toronto, called out to provide assistance to the City of Toronto during a snow storm that had crippled the public transit system and had the potential to cause additional suffering. The deployment spanned 14 to 17 January, and provides a good example of no input received at the ALLC. There is nothing in the database but the Post-Operation Report that

was initiated but never completed.

OP QUADRILLE (SUMMIT OF AMERICAS, APR 2001)

Land Forces Quebec Area formed an Inter-Agency Joint Task Force to provide logistic support for the “Summit of Americas” meeting, held in Quebec City 9 to 27 April 2001. In addition to the military, the two major elements involved were the Department of International Affairs and International Trade, and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, in concert with police agencies of the local jurisdictions.

Op QUADRILLE produced several pertinent lessons at both the strategic/operational level and at the tactical level. Clear and timely strategic direction is required from higher headquarters so that the Area Headquarters can understand its complete role and responsibilities. Furthermore, it is essential that directives connected to NBC issues are clear and effectively promulgated. The strategic headquarters level must name a commander of such an inter-agency force very quickly, providing the capacities to absorb, plan, and control the operation, as occurred during Op QUADRILLE.

Constant liaison is essential for effective interoperability. Headquarters staffs and any augmentation should be working together as soon as possible, in order to effect joint planning. One of the problems within this combined headquarters was a lack of policies regarding the use of force. NDHQ must find a way to approve and promulgate ROEs much more quickly. It should be reiterated that contingency plans are required at all levels of command. Finally, CIMIC proved invaluable for establishing and maintaining lines of communication between the various civilian agencies and the CF; this was particularly important during the initial planning stages.

At the tactical level, security became an overarching concern. Operational security proved problematic in that not all of the participating personnel held the requisite clearances or the same concepts of security. The other side of the security issue was raised by the absence of Intelligence Officers down to the unit level. The concern with an NBC threat was addressed by creating an NBC Response Centre. This was generated from amalgamated support from the Joint NBC Company, Decontamination Platoon from 5 Service Battalion, and civil and military firefighters.

OP GRIZZLY (G8 SUMMIT SUPPORT, KANANASKIS, ALBERTA, 26–27 JUNE 2002)

Canada hosted the G8 Summit at Kananaskis, Alberta on 26-27 June 2002. Op GRIZZLY was a joint effort that fell under the provisions of DCDS 2/98,

“Assistance to Federal Law Enforcement Agencies.” LFWA was the lead headquarters.

At the strategic/operational level, once again, the requirement for constant liaison was noted. Coordination between Land Force Area staff (Domestic Operations Detachments) and the Provincial government facilitated a better understanding of the capabilities and resources of the respective agencies; one must not forget the value of keeping these lines of communication open at all times. Furthermore, when on operations, the CF requires a unified command structure and location. Without this, the number of Liaison Officers and the time lag required to operate through them are unwieldy. Many such difficulties could be ameliorated if the CF were to develop a set of Standard Operating Procedures for Domestic Operations.

Operational Security proved problematic as the deployed elements had insufficient means for communicating securely with external agencies during the planning phases, and many external players lacked DND-recognized security clearances. The ROE process proved inadequate during this mission as well. It needs a serious re-examination with a view to having the JAG commence ROE review much earlier in the process. Regarding NBC Individual Protective Equipment, it was determined that a re-evaluation of critical force protection assets and holdings of detection and protective equipment and the quality and quantity of NBC training was required. NBC policy was another area in which no specific direction was provided by NDHQ.

While the problems of administering Reservists stems from the NDHQ level, the benefits of utilizing these part-time soldiers are clearly seen at the tactical, deployed level. The use of Reservists, particularly if from the local area or having deployed on similar operations, provide a depth of experience and the freedom of movement that becomes a great force multiplier for Domestic Operations. The augmentation and screening procedures for Op GRIZZLY have, once again, highlighted a serious deficiency in the CF personnel system. The direction that all reservists employed operationally, domestic or otherwise, must be on a Class C contract is not in question, but the existing procedures to convert a reservist from Class A or B to Class C do not make any distinction between an international and domestic operation, and they should.

Many of the tactical-level problems regarding Reserve employment noted in the post-operation report are personnel issues. These stem from shortfalls in staff and line serials at unit and subunit level, as well as the requirement for additional personnel, such as liaison officers or NBC sentries. On one side of the coin, recruiting and retention must be arranged so that units are

closer to full-strength; on the other, Reserve units cannot be seen as a ready pool for Regular Force personnel deploying. These troops are often key to the effective training and functioning of Reserve units; they need to be there.

Another issue, which merely requires reinforcement, is the criticality of the CO's Recce; this advanced reconnoitering is essential for proper direction and guidance of units in their respective tasks. One particular, newly issued piece of equipment that proved most useful during this operation was the All-Terrain Vehicle. Usage of ATVs was deemed essential for support operations.

OP PEREGRINE (FOREST FIREFIGHTING, BRITISH COLUMBIA, AUGUST/SEPTEMBER 2003)

Operation PEREGRINE supported the B.C. government's forest firefighting efforts—a task lasting 45 days, ended on 17 September 2003, and involved more than 2,600 CF personnel.

The main strategic point, reiterated from previous reports, concerns Reservists. Activation of Reserve Forces for urgent Domestic Ops must be simplified. It was reaffirmed that it is more efficient to use troops from the local area in the deployment than to bring in personnel from elsewhere in the country. Cohesion and mutual understanding was simpler with known soldiers in addition to enhancing the CF footprint in the community. As with previous operations, a clear directive from CDS that amplifies class C contracts on short notice, with appropriate freedom of action, must be issued.

At the tactical level, once again constant liaison is required in order to keep the HQ staff synchronized with Provincial entities. This is essential for effective operations, and it also permits the creation of common language or terminology with provincial and civilian personnel unfamiliar with “military speak.” Such liaison improves and accelerates communications and actions. This is more critical when there are decentralized Areas of Operations, which also facilitates closer integration with civilian entities. Equipment-wise, it was suggested that units deploy with night-vision capabilities and Motorola-type communications.

OP ARGONAUT (HOMELESS SHELTER IN EXTREME COLD WEATHER, TORONTO, 2004)

During the period 15 January to 12 February 2004 Land Force Central Area allowed the City of Toronto to establish a temporary homeless shelter within Fort York Armouries.

This tasking emphasized the requirement to have legal documents and any supporting agreements signed prior to delivery of military services. Even though this mission differed markedly from those previously reported, the requirement for constant liaison with civilian counterparts remained extant. In this instance, the CF had to ensure that all Emergency Measures Centres were aware of the shelter's existence in order to advise the homeless and ensure adequate emergency services (police, ambulance) coverage. This tasking also highlighted the requirement for having Public Affairs officers in location; there is an essential need for media liaison when civilians in crisis are in CF armouries. The other augmentation suggested was to use Commissionaires for Armouries security.

RECENT DOMESTIC EXERCISES

A growing number of practical exercises and command-post exercises (CPX) have taken place in the various Land Forces Areas, however, since the learning process and the ALLC are only gradually gaining visibility and common understanding of our responsibility to disseminate and keep all PXR data for the Army, the Centre has very few PXR related to Domestic Operations.

Ex REACTION ROYALE was a week-long CPX focusing primarily on a terrorist threat in downtown Montreal, specifically a dirty bomb in a Montreal Subway, which required the SQFT Immediate Response Unit (IRU) activation and employment. This exercise was based on the Contingency Operational Plan (COP) to activate the SQFT HQ Op TEMPO. The exercise also practiced communications in a secure environment (i.e. TITAN). While troops were not part of the exercise, the participants included an exercise director, staff, observers and controllers, liaison officers and civilian partners.

The exercise reaffirmed that legal documents, including ROE, must be clearly defined and understood. Establishing and maintaining regular liaison with civilian entities ensures a proper understanding of military resources and assistance available, as well as any limitations. Liaison will also bring forth the resources civilians bring.

Ex DECON COLPRO practiced inter-agency cooperation with Ottawa Fire Services and potential CF chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear resources, namely a troop from the Regiment de Hull and a platoon from the Governor General's Foot Guards, for decontaminating chemical casualties from a terrorist attack. The exercise demonstrated the requirement for clear direction for humanitarian assistance support within a CBRN scenario. There was an obvious lack of resources for the tasks

assigned, indicating a disconnect between higher headquarters' understanding of requirements and the logistics system's ability to provide the requisite material in a timely manner. What equipment was available required advanced training and maintenance before effective usage. This exercise reaffirmed the need for close liaison with Emergency Medical Services, and possibly cross training, which also requires the creation of a common language.

Ex VIRTUAL GRIZZLY was created in preparation for the actual Op GRIZZLY (G8 Summit support). The intent was to exercise the master plan, with five days of training on the JANUS computer system comprising was the actual exercise. The major points accruing from this training were in making use of an already existing contingency plan, as well as the inherent difficulties in maintaining effective communications while practicing operational security.

SUMMARY

So, what lessons can be garnered from these disparate operations and exercises?

COMMAND

1. Building liaison at all levels is key to success—before, during, and after operations.
2. Understanding domestic operations directives and structure is essential for all key players.
3. Identify equipment and resource shortfalls on a continuous basis, and make them known to higher headquarters.
4. Rules of engagement must be provided by NDHQ in a timely manner, and promulgated and understood by all leaders and soldiers. Clear, simple ROEs are essential, particularly issued in time so that junior leadership can review and clarify any issues with the troops.
5. Operational security awareness is required and must be practiced regularly.

SENSE

1. Usage of liaison officers at unit and sub-unit is critical.

ACT

1. Decentralize areas of operations down to company level,

synchronized with civilian boundaries, and allow for appropriate freedom of action.

SUSTAIN

1. Reserve Class C contract guidance for domestic operations must be clear, effective and efficient.
2. Upon arriving to augment Regular Force units, reservists benefit significantly from an arrival assistance group system to address the various bureaucratic requirements imposed upon their service.

TRAINING

1. Military leadership should be aware of contingency plans, and use them to frame training planning.
2. Exercises are important to build cohesion in a joint, integrated, multi-agency, and public environment.
3. Specialized pre-deployment training should be incorporated wherever possible. This could include firefighting, EMS cross training, animal protection, etc.

What this presentation has demonstrated is that domestic operations are not new, will continue to be a military task for the foreseeable future, and that improvements need to be made. Operations will continue to include reacting to humanitarian disasters, providing force protection at major events, and re-establishing security in the event of civil unrest or a terrorist attack. Regular, reserve, and civilian agencies, for the sake of the Canadian citizens they are sworn to protect, are obliged to streamline and make more effective their coordinated actions.

For more information or updates, see the Army Lessons' Learned Centre website at <http://armyapp.dnd.ca/allc/main.asp> or the Lessons' Learned Knowledge Warehouse on the Defence Information Net (DIN) website: http://lfdts.army.mil.ca/allc/llkw_drlr.asp.

ENDNOTES

1. *Dispatches*.

<http://lfds.army.mil.ca/ALLC/Downloads/dispatches.asp?tree=downloads>. *The Bulletin*. <http://lfds.army.mil.ca/ALLC/Downloads/bulletin.asp?tree=downloads>. "Lessons Learned Knowledge Warehouse."

http://lfds.army.mil.ca/ALLC/llkw_drlr.asp.

2. For a further examination of this issue, see Brigadier-General Tim Grant's article in this volume.

RESPONSE TO NATIONAL SECURITY INCIDENTS: PUBLIC SAFETY EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

Mr Pierre Gagnon
Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada

The September 11th terrorist attacks brought home with a startling clarity the need for better coordination among core Federal Departments and Agencies responsible for public safety and security. A perceived lack of clarity after this event about “who does what” regarding public safety and security led to the creation of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada (PSEPC) on 12 December 2003, with a mission to enhance the safety and security of Canadians.

With a vision of providing a safer, more secure Canada, PSEPC provides leadership in emergencies of national importance through around-the-clock co-ordination and support across government and to key national players in the event of national emergencies. This is accomplished by ensuring alert and warning systems across governments respond effectively to threats, in addition to monitoring and analyzing cyber attacks and threats, issuing alerts and advisories as required and providing support during cyber-related incidents.

These activities fall quite naturally from the Canadian government’s mandate for addressing both domestic and international incidents, fusing both crisis and consequence management in pre-emptive as well as reactive strategic operations. PSEPC now provides a single point of contact for international events affecting the national interest, allowing for immediate access to expert knowledge in areas of national security, consequence management, cyber and public communications.

The various Agencies comprising PSEPC all feature distinct mandates and reporting structure. Emergency Management and National Security is responsible for operational readiness and responses, as well as policy and program coordination. Those within Portfolio Relations and Public Affairs oversee communications, strategic policy and portfolio coordination, and Ministerial coordination and liaison. The Policing and Law Enforcement branch addresses policy issues regarding policing, borders, and firearms, as well as taking the lead on integrated justice information. The Crime Prevention Centre, Corrections and conditional release, and Aboriginal

policing issues are within the purview of Community Safety and Partnerships personnel. Naturally, there is a Corporate Management element as well, which is not shown in Figure 1.




Figure 1: Departmental Overview: Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada

NATIONAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE SYSTEM

To add context one must remember that the National Emergency Response System (NERS) initiative is part of a broader PSEPC project to improve the existing national emergency management framework that will address the other three pillars of emergency management: mitigation, preparedness and recovery. PSEPC was established in December 2003, and began immediate consultations and discussions with the various federal, provincial and territorial partners. Throughout these discussions, it was strongly recommended that we focus, as a priority, on improving the exiting national response framework. That is why, in addition to the mandate from the National Security Policy, the NERS initiative was undertaken on a priority basis within PSEPC.

When an incident or crisis occurs, numerous departments and agencies are inevitably drawn in by their mandates and jurisdictions. These disparate groups must work together. The NERS was designed to ensure a harmonized federal response to a multiple mandate incident by coordinating the various federal mandates. Specifically the NERS provides early identification and reporting of any emerging, imminent or occurring incidents that may affect the “national interest.” The NERS further supports senior officials and Ministers in the development of incident-specific national policy direction, in addition to developing and implementing incident-specific “whole of government” strategic action plans. These are the NERS’ three

major objectives.

The Prime Minister has overall responsibility for Canada's national security and the safety of its citizens. The Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness supports him, with the National Security Advisor providing additional assistance for national security issues. A Government Operations Centre provides support to these overarching bodies.

The Government Operations Centre provides strategic level coordination on behalf of the Government of Canada in response to an emerging or occurring event affecting the national interest. The Centre does this through continuous 24/7 monitoring and analysis of domestic and global events. Duty Officers are assigned for cyber, national security and consequence management events. CBSA, DND, Health Canada and RCMP are embedded within this department for immediate Ops Centre duties as required, and broader representation is currently developing.

The Government Operations Centre has a mandate that fuses crisis and consequence management for domestic and international incidents. To accomplish this task it maintains full-time connectivity to Provinces, Territories, federal Departments and Agencies, and to the US Department of Homeland Security. Of note, it is the single point of contact for international events affecting the national interest.

As mentioned, the Ops Centre constantly monitors and reports on potentially critical activities. It has three Response Levels to address issues requiring increased capability and capacity, and to ensure proactive and timely readiness and response activities:

Level 1—Initial Risk Assessment and incident monitoring

Level 2—Contingency Planning and Limited Response

Level 3—Full Government of Canada response

This structure naturally does not need to be fully activated for every incident. It was designed with three levels of activation to provide the Government of Canada with increasing capability and capacity to respond to emergencies. The activation or escalation criteria are based on an emerging, imminent, or occurring event that may affect the national interest. It may be the result of real or expected media attention, or at the request or anticipated request for assistance from a provincial or territorial government or federal department/agency. Strategic coordination may be further required due to the event being large or widespread, several events, or the involvement of large numbers of responding federal agencies and

departments.

The Government Operations Centre supports the decision making process of the Associate Deputy Minister (ADM) committees and the PSEP Cabinet Committee by providing a series of incident-related information and decision-making products. The membership of both the ADM committees and this Cabinet Committee will be adjusted based on the type of emergency. Activities under the NERS mainly occur within this Government Operations Centre, which is housed within the Operations Directorate. This Centre provides strategic coordination and direction to federal departments and agencies and interfaces with Provincial/Territorial and international partners. It is important to note that the Privy Council Office and the National Security Advisor are represented in the Government Operations Centre and on the ADM committees and, of course, support this Committee. Also, the structure is sufficiently flexible that it can be modified as required to accelerate the decision making process.

Clearly, to have a truly national system, the Federal component of the NERS has to effectively complement and interact with the various existing provincial and territorial response systems to ensure timely and effective federal support when Canada is faced with an emergency.

NATIONAL STRATEGIC CONTINGENCY/ACTION PLANNING

National Strategic Contingency Planning occurs routinely in advance of known or potential events. These planning sessions involve stakeholders from the key departments and agencies, who gather to produce coordinated policy direction. Such contingency planning has occurred over issues of forest fire season, the Greek Olympics, and the US elections and inauguration.

National Strategic Action Planning occurs once an event has commenced, and involves similar stakeholders. The planning may be geared towards a specific objective, or by an operational period. As such, because events are not always amenable to scheduling, some incidents may require multiple operational periods.

An issue that is requiring an increasing amount of planning effort, amongst those responsible for National Security Incidents, is terrorism. Terrorism may involve threats to the security of Canada, threats against diplomatic residences, Internationally Protected Persons (IPPs) or families within Canada, or persons designated by the Solicitor General. While the Senate Standing Committee on National Security and Defence has identified a total of 109 definitions of terrorism throughout the world, here in Canada

“terrorism” is captured within the definition of threats to the security of Canada contained in the CSIS Act, the Security Offences Act, and the Anti-Terrorism Act, known as Bill C-36: Acts of serious violence for the purpose of achieving a political, religious or ideological objective within Canada or a foreign state.

For terrorist incidents, the Federal government leads in the spheres of investigation and disruptive operations. Provinces and Territories lead in consequence management. The National Counter Terrorism Plan (NCTP) assists in this division by providing coordination mechanisms and spelling out Cabinet-mandated federal responsibilities. Although approved by the Government in 1989, it remains a “living document,” constantly undergoing revision. It provides integrated policy/operational response to terrorist incidents and offers support and policy guidance to the police Incident Commander. It is designed for localized, contained incidents. As such, it provides limited consequence management support, which is provided under OCIEP National Counter-Terrorism Consequence Management Arrangements. Although the NCTP is designed for local incidents, the NERS does provide for an almost identical coordinating response for major incidents (e.g. with a NCTP hostage situation in an embassy or on a plane—with NERS Massive destruction i.e. chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear attack).

Federally, the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness is the lead Minister for terrorist threats and incidents occurring in Canada, with the Minister of Foreign Affairs taking the lead for terrorist threats and incidents occurring outside of Canada. In both cases, the Minister of National Defence plays a supporting role. The RCMP have primary but not exclusive responsibility for terrorist-related offences, by virtue of subsection 6(1) of the Security Offences Act. Where the RCMP is not the local police, the police of jurisdiction and the RCMP have a shared responsibility (joint force operation).

The NCTP provides standing policies that are based on international agreement and national policies. These emphasize that, in all instances, terrorist incidents are criminal offences, and that the “rule of law” shall be maintained: this is not a military issue, it is law enforcement. For hostage/barricaded persons incidents, every effort will be made to seek a peaceful resolution, but no substantive concessions shall be granted; terrorists will not gain from their criminal acts, and no “take-off” authority will be granted except in extraordinary circumstances.

The role of the Canadian Forces is envisaged as providing a support response, such as armed assistance to the police, and during the subsequent

consequence management phase. For armed assistance, the request is based on police capabilities: as a rule once the police capabilities are expended or overwhelmed. This is passed up the RCMP chain of command because the PSEPC Minister and the MND will have to mutually agree to commitment. The request would go to the Divisional Emergency Operations Center to the National Operations Center then to the PSEPC Minister and finally to the DND Minister. Prior to any portion of an incident being handed over to the military, there will be acknowledgment of areas of responsibility and command, “call back” and “point of no return” issues, and the return of the incident process.

Joint Task Force 2, as DND’s counter-terrorist unit, is most clearly seen as providing armed assistance to the RCMP by providing a force capable of rendering armed assistance in the resolution of an incident that is, or has the potential of, affecting the national interest. While their primary focus is counter-terrorism, the unit can expect to be employed on other high value strategic tasks. Accompanying the unit are liaison personnel who may be deployed to the RCMP National Operations Centre, with the Incident Commander and with the police public communications officer(s) near or at the site of an incident. But overall, any incident requiring CF direct support will remain under civilian control, or will revert to civil control at the earliest opportunity.

Further information can be obtained online at www.psepc.gc.ca.

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ONTARIO

Mr Joseph Moore and Mr Dave Clarke

Within Canada, each province is individually responsible for public safety, legally guided and restrained by its own Emergency Legislation. Within Ontario, ONLY the Head of Council can declare a state of Local Emergency—a declaration that confers extraordinary powers.

According to *Ontario's Emergency Management Act (2002)*, an emergency is “a situation or impending situation caused by forces of nature, accident, or an intentional act that constitutes a danger of major proportions to life and property.” Such emergencies can threaten: Public Health (SARS), Environment (Forest Fires), Critical Infrastructure, (Blackout), Property (Floods/Hurricanes), Economic Stability (Border Crossings), and any number of inherently complex combinations.

To ensure a common understanding of terminology, a “State of Local Emergency” is addressed at a municipal level, whereas a “State of Emergency” or “Disaster” is a Provincial and/or Federal issue. A crisis may evolve to a different level from its original declaration, particularly given the potential scale of crises that can develop within Ontario. The province is the scene of 50 percent of Canadian chemical production, 30 million shipments of hazardous products, and the largest nuclear jurisdiction producing 40 percent of its electrical power. Ontario is struck by 20 tornadoes annually, and is the setting for 60 percent of all hazardous material road and rail accidents within Canada.

In all, Ontario is an intensive social environment, whose infrastructure is reliant on complex but aging technology. The yearly floods, forest fires, and earthquakes, augmented by evolving health and agricultural emergencies, do not make Ontario an unsafe place to live. They do, however, create an environment wherein the public interest requires a more proactive approach to emergency management on the part of all governments, business/industrial sectors, and private individuals. This is where Emergency Management Ontario enters the picture. When one factors in Canada's largest, most concentrated population and the province's extensive, aging infrastructure there is clearly scope for emergency preparedness planning and training. The two illustrations following should give cause for concern.¹




Figure 1: Aging Infrastructure




Figure 2: Canadian Public Investment/GDP

Emergency Management Ontario (EMO) falls under the Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services. EMO, with a staff of 79 personnel and 15 regionally pre-deployed officers, is based in Toronto. It is organized into six sections:

- Program Coordination and Standards
- Community Programs
- Provincial Mitigation and Preparedness
- Provincial Response and Recovery
- Training and Education

- Support Programs

with a mandate to promote, monitor, coordinate and assist in the development and implementation of risk-based comprehensive emergency management programs throughout Ontario.

The mission of EMO is to create safe, secure, and “disaster-resilient” communities through comprehensive emergency management programs. They do this by providing advice, assistance, and liaison to communities before, during and after an emergency. The organization’s Community Officers and Public Education Officers participate in community exercises and provide training and workshops, which include advice and products for Public Awareness and Public Education programs.

EMO coordinates provincial emergency responses as part of its administration of the Joint Emergency Preparedness Program (JEPP). This Federal program, established in 1980, is designed to enhance the national capability to manage all types of emergencies and ensure a reasonably uniform emergency response and recovery capacity across Canada. So while Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada (PSEPC) administers JEPP nationally, EMO is responsible for aspects of the program within Ontario. One key portion of this emergency response capability is the Provincial Emergency Operations Centre, which is operated by EMO and staffed on a 24/7 basis. During an emergency, the Operations Centre’s staffing can expand from “enhanced monitoring,” through “partial activation,” up to “full activation.”

Amongst the recent changes to EMO operations is the new *Emergency Management Act* (2002), through which Emergency Management Programs are now mandatory for both Municipalities and provincial Ministries. This has placed greater emphasis on training, exercises and both public awareness and education.

Under the auspices of the *Emergency Management Act* there is now an increased focus upon 4 key components:

- **Mitigation:** taking action to reduce or prevent the impact of emergencies
- **Preparedness:** Preparing plans and conducting training, exercises, and public education
- **Response:** Managing an emergency situation and providing emergency information
- **Recovery:** Providing disaster assistance to return to normal

The Framework documents for both the Provincial and Municipal programs have been adopted as the standard for emergency management in Ontario. The standard is based upon NFPA 1600 and other international best practices.² As such, Ontario's emergency management program has three components: "Essential," "Enhanced," and "Comprehensive." These have been determined through risk-based planning.

Under the "Essential" component, every Community must now have a designated Community Emergency Management Coordinator (CEMC). EMO will provide this individual with the training, products, advice and assistance required to enable them to design, implement and maintain their community's emergency management program. Further, every municipality must have an emergency management program committee that brings together local stakeholders to assist in program development, implementation and maintenance. This is the key organization for making the emergency management process work at the local level. This management committee oversees the community- approved emergency response plan, and an obligatory Emergency Operations Centre (EOC).

Every community must identify its critical infrastructure. Critical infrastructures are those facilities and technologies that our society requires to function. Once identified, Emergency Management Ontario can start to mitigate, prepare for, respond to and recover from hazards that could negatively impact our critical infrastructure.

The first step toward the development of an appropriate emergency response capability begins with the identification of emergency equipment, training, and personnel available. The Community Control Group (CCG) and the staff that work in, or provide support to, the EOC must be trained in their individual and collective roles and responsibilities as well as emergency operation centre procedures. An annual tabletop exercise intended to confirm the CCG and EOC staff training must be conducted. The public also has a right to know and be aware of the hazards and risks they face within their community. They must also be attentive to what they should, or may be expected to, do during an emergency. The provision of emergency information to the media and our citizens is a critical function of emergency management. Staff must be identified and trained to perform this function.

Under the Essential Program, a final annual program review must also be completed. This review culminates with the Head of Council, chair of the community emergency management committee, and the CEMC submitting a signed statement of program achievement to Emergency Management Ontario. The Chief Administrative Officer must require that all CCG

members attend training and exercise; there are no exceptions.

There are several significant responsibilities and authorities regarding a declaration of emergency. Head of Council may declare an emergency. Head of Council, the Council, or the Premier may declare an emergency terminated. Declaration permits the Head of Council to take extraordinary measures. A member of council may be appointed in the place of, and assume all powers and duties of, the Head of Council.

Such an emergency declaration provides a legal framework to commit exceptional means to address exceptional situations. For example, it allows the Head of Council to make decisions which might normally require the consent of full council, such as the suspension of some bylaws or regulations. As well, it allows greater access to additional resources, supplies and services, and extends Workplace Safety and Insurance Board coverage and protection to Registered volunteers.

So how would Ontario's response to an emergency fall into place should an incident occur? If a local industrial site suffers a critical chemical leak, for example, the initial response would be in the form of an on-site emergency response team being activated. Outside resources, such as Fire or Ambulance may be called in, working together under Incident Command or Unified Command system.

If there was the danger of an off-site chemical release, the local population would be notified and the city's Emergency Plan may be activated. This would cause the Control Group to gather at the Emergency Operations Centre. Should the situation be such that an Emergency Declaration is necessary, the Mayor must inform Emergency Management Ontario, even though EMO may have already received advance notice through other means.

An EMO Community Officer would likely be deployed, and perhaps a Provincial Emergency Response Team. The PER Team was formalized in the mid-1990s following a major nuclear exercise. It is a multi-disciplinary, inter-ministerial team that liaises with and supports emergency response entities during large or complex incidents. It may include EMO field staff, Ministry staff, emergency information officers, technical experts and other human or material resources. It is authorized to speak for, and represent, the Provincial Operations Centre (POC).

At same time, the POC could transition from Routine or Enhanced Monitoring to partial or Full Activation. Representatives of the various Provincial Ministries and Ministry Action Groups would be brought in. It is possible that military support would be sought, depending on the crisis.

PROVINCIAL-MILITARY RELATIONSHIP

The Provincial Emergency Response Plan states that if a community or provincial emergency occurs that requires assistance from federal authorities, the Provincial Operating Centre will be responsible for coordinating the response. As such, any requests for military assistance must be directed to the POC. If there are no other suitable resources available, EMO makes a request to LFCA: this request may be verbal, followed by a formal and detailed agreement.

While military support will normally be coordinated by the POC or PERT, in exceptional and widespread circumstances detailed coordination may be delegated to communities. Needless to say, the military chain of command remains intact. Some recent incidents involving the deployment of Kingston troops included the 1998 Ice Storm, the 2004 Blackout, and the recent requirement to provide tentage at a hospital in the Barrie area.

In summary, there is an important process for managing emergency responses within the province of Ontario. Quite often, this devolves to financial issues: Province requests...province pays. Community requests...community pays. Despite the formal process, however, local Commanders are not precluded from immediately responding to a life-threatening situation. Often there are pre-standing Mutual Assistance Agreements, which may cover local Fire or Ambulance support. In any event, LFCA must be notified.

As far as Public Safety is concerned perhaps the most lasting and fundamental of the basic laws of state comes from the Roman table of law:

SALUS POPULI SUPREMA EST LEX

(“THE SAFETY OF THE PEOPLE IS THE SUPREME LAW”)

—because the only thing tougher than planning for a disaster, is explaining why you failed to do so.

ENDNOTES

1. Source: Institute for Catastrophic Loss Reduction, based on data from the Federation of Canadian Municipalities, n.d.
2. NFPA 1600: Standard on Disaster/Emergency Management and Business Continuity Programs. This National Fire Prevention Association standard establishes common criteria for disaster management, emergency management, and business continuity programs. (ed.)

DOMESTIC OPERATIONS: CITY OF TORONTO

Mr Warren Leonard

City of Toronto, Office of Emergency Management

Toronto: the city that the rest of Canada loves to hate. It is Canada's largest city, with a nighttime population of 2.5 million, and it is the fifth largest city in North America. When including its outlying suburbs, the Greater Toronto Area features a population in excess of 6 million, residing within 5,902 square kilometers. The city's structure provides for numerous emergency-planning challenges, in that emergency managers and first-responders must consider 25 hospitals, 200 extended care facilities, 1,100 schools, four detention centres, six major highway systems, and land use that spans mixed light industry, suburban, and a high rise downtown core.

With these factors always in mind, this presentation will illustrate the key players in Toronto's emergency response system, as well as provide an overview of some recent crises that challenged this system and its personnel.

Toronto's 45,000 city employees deliver 40 major services including, but not limited to, fire, ambulance, police, supportive housing, roads, water and wastewater, transit and economic development. This is accomplished through receipt of only 5 percent of each dollar paid in taxes, with the remaining 95 percent going to provincial and federal governments. We shall return to some of the more significant services momentarily.

With the passage of Ontario's *Emergency Management Act (2002)*, municipalities were obliged to have an emergency management program, which includes an emergency response plan, hazard identification and risk assessment and a critical infrastructure inventory. Training and Public Education programs were also included.

As part of Toronto's emergency plan, an Emergency Management Program Committee was created, with two major sub-groups: a Control Group and a Support Group. The former includes the Mayor, Chief Administrative Officer, Works & Emergency Services Commissioner and the Chiefs of Police, Fire, and Emergency Medical Services. The Medical Officer of Health, Community & Neighbourhood Services, Economic Development, Culture & Tourism, and naturally, the Office of Emergency Management round out the Control Group.

The Support Group consists of representatives from Legal, Corporate Services, Urban Development Services, Toronto Transit Commission, GO Transit and such diverse groups as Enbridge, Bell Canada, Insurance Bureau of Canada, St. John's Ambulance and the various district School Boards

Toronto's first indication that 2003 was going to be an unusual year started with the onset of the US War on Iraq, with its attendant protests and heightened security concerns. And then things got worse...

Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), the potentially fatal respiratory illness, spread through contact with infected persons, arrived in March 2003. Although cases were reported in several other provinces, Toronto became "ground zero" during the crisis' two phases: 13 March–20 April, and 20 May–24 June. Two hundred and twenty-two patients were hospitalized, with 50 in intensive care. Of the 44 SARS-related deaths across Canada, 38 occurred in Toronto—50 percent of the cases involved healthcare workers

Although the crisis eventually played out with no significant spread of the disease within the general community, there was intense local and international media interest. Seven hundred public health personnel were assigned to address the various issues, such as surveillance, hotline, investigation and follow-up. The occupational health issues were enormous, relating to the decision to implement isolation or quarantine measures: measures which had not been used within Canada in over 50 years. Yet of the 23,322 contacts, 13,374 were quarantined, with the Medical Officer of Health issuing 27 isolation orders.

This crisis demonstrated that Medical Office of Health had broad powers, given SARS' new and unknown viral history. There was no test or diagnosis of exclusion, no vaccine and no treatment. People's apprehension of such an unknown disease was aggravated by the media coverage. Television and newspaper crews took shots outside of the SARS clinics, which provided images of people in hospital masks, seemingly everywhere. These pictures received wide distribution. Local fears of infection were heightened, and globally, the response was the avoidance of Toronto by business and leisure travelers. This had a dramatic impact upon the local economy, especially tourism and the hospitality and conference sector.

There was a momentary respite between the SAR phases, which was filled with the Bloor Street Explosion on 24 April 2003. A contractor, working on sidewalk repair, allegedly disconnected the natural gas feed from a building on one of Toronto's busier streets. The building filled with natural gas and exploded, causing seven deaths and injuring many others. This provided lessons on emergency responses in such an intense crisis, such as extracting

people from rubble in still-dangerous situations, which was not relevant during SARS. SARS however, did make a short-lived comeback 20 May - 24 June. By that time, the emergency response had been well established.

The end of July brought a Rolling Stones' SARS Benefit Concert to the city, when the Federal government decided it would help Toronto's waning tourist industry by hosting a major rock concert. This resulted in a 12-hour, multi-act concert including Rush, AC/DC and the Rolling Stones as headliners. The 600,000 people in attendance effectively created Canada's 10th largest city—inside Canada's largest city, Toronto, and the emergency planners had less than one month to prepare. As it turned out, 30 July 2003 was a VERY hot day, making crowd hydration the major health issue.

August 14, 2003, 4:10 pm was part of a normal day in Toronto. At 4:11 pm however, a widespread power outage had hit southern Ontario and the northeastern United States. The initial public reaction was the self-evacuation of the downtown core. With no subway service, people walked north. The common road congestion was much worsened by the lack of traffic lights; this did cause moments of positive reflection on human nature as civilians stepped in to direct traffic in intersections.

The Province responded by declaring the second emergency of the year, and the activation of the Provincial Operations Centre. The City responded by immediately opening its Emergency Operations Centre (EOC), with its first full media conference at 8 p.m. The city never did declare an emergency. The EOC response worked very well, despite there being no previously-established site, with dedicated communications and computer support. It was instituted early in the crisis, with senior and elected officials in attendance, although transport to the EOC was problematic for some, depending upon their regular place of residence or employment.

Many businesses were prepared for the crisis, while others proved adept at improvisation. Banks and financial institutions turned out to be the leaders in emergency contingency planning, whereas larger companies, buildings and facilities tended to be proactive, seeking to implement solutions afterwards in preparation for a following, similar crisis. Smaller businesses tended to improvise on the fly throughout the emergency.

Turning now to look specifically at the emergency services, the Toronto Fire Department consists of approximately 3,000 firefighters, situated at 81 stations. This gives Toronto the fifth largest fire department in North America. For a 27-hour period after blackout, they averaged 2.7 calls per minute at peak, or 12 times normal run volume, for a total of 2,568 runs. Of their 174 fire calls, seven were two-alarm or larger. When one includes

165 elevator rescues and 546 calls to check alarms, the Fire Service responded to a grand total of 8,764 runs between 14 and 22 August.

The 7,000 members of the Toronto police force make it the largest in Canada. During the blackout, they implemented the various “Operational Continuity Plans” that had been developed for the expected Y2K crisis.¹ These plans focused upon such things as generator use at stations to ensure the radio and computer systems remained operational. Widespread panic and public disorder, as some had predicted during Y2K, did not occur; Toronto remained peaceful. Crime even dropped. People rallied around each other for support, which is an often underestimated, but common, response to crises.

The Toronto Transit Commission provides 1.3 million trips daily for 600,000 to 700,000 daily commuters. The 90 subway trains at rush hour (i.e.: 4:11pm) carry 1100 passengers. Add to this the 248 streetcars, 1500 diesel-powered and 125 natural gas-powered buses, and 145 “Wheeltrans” buses for handicapped passengers, a large number of travellers faced being stranded. The initial priority was to evacuate the subway system. Thirty-one of 90 trains, carrying approximately 30,000 people, were trapped between stations. Each trapped train had only two crewmembers, and there was limited support from the police or fire services.

Providing the backdrop to these assorted crises was a major urban centre, looking very eerie in the absence of lighting. Not only could common landmarks not be seen, streetlamps themselves could not be seen. Thus minor injuries included facial cuts and abrasions from walking into things, and sprained ankles from walking off curbs. Over the next 44 hours (14–16 August), however, the Toronto Hydro Corporation brought the city back in stages. After the initial priority load of the water pumping stations, returning power to the hospitals took precedence. As part of the recovery program, the province announced energy conservation plans, including closing industries, to avoid rolling blackouts.

TTC subways and streetcars remained idle, and the Canadian National Exhibition opening was delayed. These latter two issues proved problematic when the media reported New York City being open for business—including the subways. NY is very experienced with public messaging, and Toronto’s public lag added to the summer’s economic woes. Delaying the CNE’s grand opening had a further impact on the mood and mindset of the public, since the Exhibition had been an annual event for 124 years.

While the province suspended services, such as driver examinations and

archives, the municipality provides a different level of service: fire, ambulance, police, homes for aged and childcare. These services affect people's lives on a daily basis, and cannot be suspended. So Toronto stayed in business.

Following a very public appeal by Mayor Lastman to conserve energy, aimed at residential, commercial and industrial users, residents reduced their overall consumption by 20 percent. Communities rallied around each other for support, and there were many positive reports of re-connecting with family, friends and neighbours. It proved to be a nice break from a hectic, urban lifestyle. Unfortunately there were some mixed messages, such as the Premier saying, "stay home to conserve energy" while Toronto was telling people, "come to work—we're open for business." Some staff declared themselves non-essential and stayed home, highlighting the need for direct human resource involvement during emergencies.

And finally . . . Toronto has not had an emergency since the multiple crises of 2003. The power is on, and Toronto is open for business.

ENDNOTES

1. The year 2000 (Y2K) problem, or millennium bug, was a computer program flaw causing some date-related processing to malfunction. Fear of critical infrastructure collapsing at midnight 1 January 2000 was driven by intense media coverage. In the end, no significant disasters occurred. (ed.)

TRAIN FOR DOMESTIC OPERATIONS

Lieutenant-Colonel Shane Brennan¹

The storm of the century highlighted one of the Canadian Forces most essential roles: protecting the lives and property of Canadians in times of crisis.²

The time has come for the Canadian Army to realistically deal with preparations for domestic operations.³ For too long the Army has solely trained for general-purpose combat, convinced that training for war prepares soldiers for all operations. Although the Army is focused on combat operations, it frequently carries out operations other than war (OOTW).⁴ The problem is that the Army does not routinely train for OOTW tasks. As demonstrated by our recent peacekeeping and humanitarian operational experiences in Croatia, Bosnia and Somalia, mission specific training is required to adequately prepare units for OOTW. Included in OOTW are domestic and international peace support operations, and the numerous tasks the Army conducts during peace. All require training to be effectively accomplished.

The difficulty and the complexity of peace support or domestic operations is now beginning to be understood and some action has been taken to address the lack of adequate preparation of units.⁵ Domestic operations are not simple missions that are easily overcome or resolved as a matter of course. They are usually multi-faceted problems that require understanding and skill to resolve. For instance, the problems a unit commanding officer faces working within layers of municipal, provincial, and federal officials and other emergency organizations during a time of crisis are not a simple matter.⁶ It is no simpler for a sergeant, instructing his soldiers on their legal authority to implement a general evacuation order or when quelling a civil disturbance.

Is the Army preparing its soldiers for the tasks they will be facing? Presently, combat operations are the only training focus. However, I believe that the Army must train soldiers on how to accomplish *all* the missions it will assign. Canadians expect their Army to be professionally trained to complete all the tasks they will likely perform, not just combat operations.

The Army is responsible to be trained and ready to respond to domestic and international threats. As future disasters are certain, the Army must be prepared to protect Canadians from a host of natural and man-made disasters that will likely strike our country. These disasters could include: a

catastrophic earthquake along the lower mainland of British Columbia, future floods, paralyzing storms that cut off essential utilities, industrial accidents such as large-scale chemical spills and any situation, natural or man-made, that overwhelms local authorities and their resources.

Also included in domestic operations are Aid to Civil Power operations, where the provinces are able to call upon the Armed Forces, usually the Army, to maintain or restore law and order where it is beyond the power of the civil authorities to do so. Section 275 of the National Defence Act states: “the Canadian Forces are liable to be called out for service in the aid of the civil power in any case in which a riot or disturbance of the peace, beyond the powers of the civil authorities to suppress . . . is, in the opinion of an attorney general, considered as likely to occur.”⁷

In short, a provincial Attorney General can request that the Canadian Forces be called out in Aid to the Civil Power. The Oka Crisis in 1990 was an example of this type of operation.

The current policy within the Army is to train only for combat operations, with the presumption that the skills required for war fighting training will be sufficient to conduct non-combat operations including domestic operations. The reality is that Army commanders and soldiers often find domestic operations difficult to organize and solve because they are unfamiliar with the multi-faceted nature of such operations. This problem needs to be addressed.

The thesis of this paper is that the Canadian Army must include domestic operations training as a part of its regular training programme to prepare soldiers to respond to these important and complex missions. In this discussion, the policy on domestic operations will be explained, and its shortcomings examined by reviewing the lessons learned from Operation ASSISTANCE.⁸ Training for domestic operations will be investigated, noting its advantages and disadvantages. The discussion will conclude with recommendations to change the current policy.

THE STATUS QUO—POLICY AND RATIONALE

Although focused on war fighting, the army’s frequent role in OOTW is critical and cannot be ignored. In military terms there may be little if any distinction between the conduct of combat operations in war fighting and operations other than war. As proven repeatedly by Canadian units, in peace and conflict, well-trained, well-led and properly equipped combat capable forces are flexible enough to adapt to the requirements of non-combat operations.⁹

The strategic objectives outlined in the 1994 White Paper assign tasks that include “protecting Canada’s national territory and areas of jurisdiction, helping civil authorities to protect and sustain national interests, and assisting in national emergencies.”¹⁰ Clearly it is the Army’s duty to be adequately prepared for domestic operations. The essential task is to ensure that the capability to effectively assist civilian authorities is maintained.

The current Army policy is that general-purpose combat training prepares soldiers for all operations.¹¹ The rationale is that combat-trained forces can respond and adapt to any situation. As such, there is no training specifically directed to or scheduled for units in domestic operations from the Land Force, Area or Brigade Headquarters.¹² Thus, there is no domestic training for the field units who will respond to internal crises. This may come as surprise to the average citizen. Further, this is not a prudent policy because the Army does not prepare for a task it must perform.

Canada is not a power-projection player on the global scene. Rather our focus is on maintaining a flexible, realistic and affordable force capable of applying military force to uphold essential Canadian values and vital security interests, at home and abroad.¹³ In fulfilling this role the Army has deployed most frequently on OOTW and most recently on domestic operations.¹⁴ The reality is that responding to natural disasters, civil unrest and peace support operations has occupied far more of our time than war fighting. These types of operations require specific skills and knowledge that can only be obtained through training. Exercises are needed to practice deployment and execution of tasks, to establish standard operating procedures and, most importantly, to develop effective civil-military coordination and cooperation.

A Marine Major General discussing his role in Operation Restore Hope in Somalia concluded, “We aren’t prepared for these operations very well.” An Army colonel recalling his staff officer duties in Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti stated, “The single hardest thing that I’ve had to do in my military experience was to come up with a OOTW campaign plan.” A Special Forces lieutenant colonel, generalizing from his own experience in Haiti, implored fellow officers to anticipate “different environments” in which they would be required to perform tasks for which they had little or no training.¹⁵

The deficiency in our current level of preparedness lies with the lack of mission specific training for domestic operations. This is troubling given the fact the Army has been regularly employed in OOTW, and, specifically, domestic operations since its creation, as Figure 1 shows.

<p>Total War World War I World War II</p> <p>Limited War Boer War Korean War Gulf War</p>	<p>Operations Other Than War Riel Rebellion, Yukon Gold Rush, Numerous labour disputes, Winnipeg Strike, UN Peace missions—Indo- China, Egypt, Congo, India, Pakistan, Cyprus, Syria, Lebanon, Cambodia, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraqi, Angola, Mozambique, Yugoslavia, Haiti, Rwanda and numerous others. Montreal Police Strike, FLQ Crisis, Olympic Games Security, Forest Fire Assistance, Oka Crisis, Security for the Pope’s visit, Flood Relief—Red, Saguenay and others rivers, Security for G7 and Asia Pacific Conferences, Eastern Canadian Ice Storm. Note: this list is not exhaustive.</p>
---	--

Figure 1: CF Operations

For the most visible and potentially the most frequent task, the Army has chosen to leave the training portion of preparation out. The basic doctrine of our battle procedure is not being followed, in that commanders are being assigned time sensitive tasks with no previous training or experience, no prior liaison with civil officials, and they are expected to adapt quickly and resolve whatever problem is being faced. Commanders and soldiers in field units need to practice their response to internal emergencies. In this regard, operational commanders are not setting the conditions for success. Subordinates are not being permitted to learn the theory, or practice the conduct of domestic operations. This is not a responsible way to prepare for domestic emergencies. It is understood that no training will ever adequately cover all situations, but some initial training will assist in addressing the concerns with respect to responsibilities, coordination, civil-military cooperation, understanding and utilizing local capabilities and preparing the unit to conduct tasks in a more efficient manner. “The main lessons from Op ASSISTANCE are: the CF’s ability to plan for, mount and deploy a joint force in response to a crisis still needs refinement; and military and civil authorities have limited knowledge and understanding of the concepts, limitations to and procedures for the conduct of CF domestic operations.”¹⁶

In short, the Canadian Forces requires training in the conduct of domestic operations and our commanders need to better understand domestic operations. Examples of problems that have been encountered include the following points noted in the Army's *Lessons Learned Report on Operation ASSISTANCE*:

- shortcomings within military headquarters in all aspects of joint operations ranging from terminology, orders formats, understanding unit capabilities, poor communications systems and the like;
- limited knowledge and understanding of legal aspects and specific responsibilities in assisting civil authorities especially in the field of law enforcement operations;
- units performed tasks in support of law enforcement operations without authority;
- because the CF was not a known quantity, credibility and trust had to be built at all levels with civilian authorities because routine contacts with emergency planning staffs were generally social and superficial; and
- joint civilian-military operations centres were not established to coordinate tasks.

Another statement that identifies the training shortfall is the recommendation by Headquarters I Canadian Brigade Group that in order to reinforce domestic operations procedures and to allow face-to-face liaison with civilian authorities, annual training in the form of a command post exercise occur.¹⁷

A specific example, highlighted during Operation ASSISTANCE, was that soldiers and their commanders had limited knowledge of the directives on the Provision of Services and the Canadian Forces Assistance to Provincial Police Force Directions.¹⁸ During this crisis soldiers patrolled evacuated areas and enforced evacuation orders without a clear understanding of their powers or the limitations of their authority. This difficulty could have been easily resolved by periodic unit level training where such issues could have been identified and clarified.

The following quote in the Operation ASSISTANCE lessons learned summary indicates action is required: "these general purpose skills must be complemented by specialized training in several areas . . . command and staff training should include the study of legislative basis and the principles of conduct of domestic operations . . . and manoeuvre brigade group

headquarters must understand the unique circumstances of domestic operations.”¹⁹ Despite these signals to implement training for domestic operations, the report concludes with “it is assessed that the incorporation of domestic operations into the regular collective training of the three environments is not warranted. However, time and resources permitting periodic joint exercises of domestic operations scenarios would validate contingency plans . . .”²⁰ All the recommendations fall short of admitting that annual training for domestic operations training is required. The reason appears to be the reluctance to acknowledge that OOTW demand training and skills that combat training does not provide. The solution is to train personnel. There is no other effective method of addressing the problem.

THE SOLUTION—TRAINING FOR DOMESTIC OPERATIONS

Specific tasks the Army could address in regular training that would better prepare units for domestic operations include:

- rules of engagement theory and legal aspects;
- knowledge of legal responsibilities during Aid to Civil Power and Aid to Civil Authority tasks;
- humanitarian relief, working with various levels of governments and with non- government-organizations (NGOs), and specifics on establishing security for refugee centers, mass food distribution sites convoys and the like;
- negotiation and liaison skills;
- riot and large demonstration control;²¹
- security of vital points and key officials;
- cordon and search procedures;
- establishment of static and mobile vehicle checkpoints; and
- media awareness training to harness the power of the media in achieving mission goals.

In fact, many of the tasks listed above are conducted when units prepare for international deployments but not during regular annual training (less media training which some units now conduct). At present, the Army benefits from this training because, at least, it creates a base of corporate knowledge that can be applied for domestic operations. Unfortunately, not all field units undergo this experience. Although Canadians expect the Army to professionally conduct all these domestic operations in a routine fashion,

they are anything but routine because the Army does not specifically train for them. Instead of relying on soldiers to quickly adapt, why doesn't the Army prepare soldiers for the tasks they are likely to perform? In the light of the Somalia Inquiry, is it really fair to suggest that war-fighting soldiers can readily adapt to a situation other than war? The notion that preparing soldiers for war will also prepare them for any situation short of war has not been borne out by experience. The complexity of domestic operations in comparison to conventional war fighting is just beginning to be acknowledged.²² Training is required for any significantly different task. Domestic operations are different from war fighting and they require specific training to execute efficiently. Just as units conduct mission specific training for peace support operations, they should also conduct mission specific training for domestic operations. The way to maintain readiness is to train for it. An emergency is neither the time nor place to be refining or working through problems that can be addressed by training.

This training could take many forms. It could be as simple as responding to a natural disaster scenario or incorporating domestic operations into combat exercises as part of a transitional phase from war to humanitarian assistance or vice versa. Another means would be to routinely train with civil authorities and police forces in the unit's garrison city. The inclusion of this training is not a difficult step but a necessary one to ensure domestic readiness. In all cases, commanders would have to make contact with local municipal officials, police, and fire departments. Further training could include NGOs, local businesses, and citizens of the community. After reconnaissance and coordination the unit could then deploy into the community or training area to work through the various scenarios.

Regular training in domestic operations will ensure preparedness. Exercises train units and headquarters, validate contingency plans and capability, test doctrine and exercise command and control systems. Only by execution of plans and coordination with all the key agencies involved in domestic operations can problems be resolved. Training should be designed to confirm the likely tasks, develop organizations, identify equipment needed, understand legal responsibilities, establish liaison with civil agencies and most importantly ensure that personnel can perform the tasks in an efficient manner. It is only through training that liaisons, trust and cooperation can be developed between civilian and military emergency headquarters.

THE BENEFITS OF TRAINING FOR DOMESTIC OPERATIONS

*Training is the foundation of readiness.*²³

Simply put, those who train for a specific task will perform that task with

more skill and more efficiency than those who do not. Armies train so they are better able to accomplish missions. Domestic operations are no different; they require the same training commitment as traditional war fighting tasks.

There are numerous benefits that will come with dedicated training for domestic operations. These include improved military interaction with federal, provincial and municipal governments, the business community and the population in general. The Canadian Army has generally maintained a low profile within the country and I submit that by training within the community, the Army's visibility will be raised to the Army's benefit. Regular training in the public's eye on tasks with direct relevance to citizens will help reinforce the bond between citizen and soldier. Unfortunately, the public and sometimes the government appear unaware of the value and role the Army plays internationally and domestically. Training for domestic operations could improve this situation. "Differences in military and civilian methods of operation can also create friction until initial mutual understanding and confidence are achieved . . . a steep learning curve awaited the JTF [Joint Task Force] Commander and his staff upon arrival in Winnipeg."²⁴

Domestic emergency planning is a specific responsibility of local government but the actual execution is normally a joint effort between all levels of government and emergency agencies, including the military. Military forces complement and supplement the action of the local government.²⁵ One way to improve cooperation and understanding between the players is to train together. Partial execution of key portions of any plan is just as critical as rehearsals and training are essential for any Army operation. Mistakes are better addressed in preparations than in execution. Only training will remedy the cooperation problem identified in the Operation ASSISTANCE post-operation report.²⁶

Another advantage that training could provide is the opportunity to work with NGOs. As noted in numerous post operations reports, "coordination between militaries and civilian agencies on all levels is essential during all phases of peace support operations."²⁷ Domestic operations training is an ideal means of preparing units for peace support operations while at the same time achieving higher readiness within Canada. Furthermore, the units would be better trained for all levels of operations. In addition, the NGOs would also benefit by building working relationships with the Army. Clearly this would be a win-win situation, where both parties would mutually benefit from the experience.

Another benefit of adding this training is that units will be better prepared

for civil-military cooperation. Civil-military cooperation is an area that is not well-covered in current training and lends itself to practical application in training for domestic operations. Specifically, junior and senior leaders will benefit from the interaction with the various layers of government, NGOs and other volunteer organizations during domestic operations training. In the end there would be better civil-military awareness and training for unit personnel.

Tasks are often time-sensitive. In domestic operations, as in war, speed and tempo are important for success. The sooner that planned operations begin, the sooner the danger or damage is assessed, controlled and effective relief measures are put in place. Conducting regular training will improve the speed of response by raising the general readiness for domestic response.

To summarize, the benefits of training for domestic operations would include better performance during an emergency because of preparation, improved civil-military cooperation and heightened awareness of the value and role of the military. As well, commanders and soldiers would be better prepared for international humanitarian missions and finally, the Army would maintain a state of readiness for the tasks they are most likely to be assigned.

ARGUMENTS AGAINST TRAINING FOR DOMESTIC OPERATIONS

Just like the river they were fighting, the armed forces people trickled in at first and grew to become a mighty flood. In the beginning, the soldiers slipped quietly into Manitoba lest they upset an already nervous population. A month later, when the military had saved the day and won the hearts of thousands, people thronged Portage Avenue and Main Street to wave a tearful goodbye to their troops.²⁸

The Army has responded to numerous domestic operations and has been seen to be effective. Why change? Critics argue that the present system of training for combat operations is adequate for the Army to be effective in any role. There is no denying that there are advantages that arise once field units deploy and commanders get on the scene. Generally, soldiers will improve the situation by providing such capabilities and services as an efficient planning and coordination, headquarters and an effective communication network. Further, it provides a disciplined force capable of maintaining or restoring law and order and an organized general and skilled labour force to reconstruct essential infrastructure. The Army has the all-terrain mobility to provide assistance where necessary, and the capability to

establish temporary shelters, food and water distribution points and to provide large-scale emergency first aid services. Finally, the deployment of the Army demonstrates the government's resolve to remedy a situation.

There is no question that general-purpose combat training has provided the basis for success, but, as experience has shown, improvements are necessary. A closer examination of the problems encountered during Operation ASSISTANCE highlights the fact that improvements are indeed necessary. Unfortunately, the overall success of past operations has perhaps lessened the impetus to address the training problems. Further, it is suggested that Operation ASSISTANCE was a perceived success for the Canadian Forces because of what did not happen during the deployments, rather than what did. Large numbers of Canadians did not die waiting for relief actions. There was no civil disobedience that required military intervention. Any disagreements with civilian government officials about the role of the military were eventually resolved behind the scenes. There were no negative media stories generated about the military. Operation ASSISTANCE was successful because of the visible and concrete action that was taken by military units upon arrival and the public realization that the military was the last resource Canada had to help the situation. But, as in war, even if you are successful in the previous conflict, you must continue to improve on the training and general state of your forces. In a similar vein, the Army should not fail to improve on its ability to respond to domestic crises.

Past successes do not absolve the responsibility of the Army to change current policy. Indeed, the Army should not wait until a failure occurs before improvement is made. The acid test is to ask the question: "Why did the Army concentrate solely on war fighting capabilities, knowing that it was the only national agency organized and capable of providing meaningful assistance in a large scale natural disaster or security operation?" Can the Army, morally, legally and ethically, continue to fail to specifically address training for internal emergencies? The answer should be that the Army must maintain a credible readiness to respond to domestic operations, and this readiness should include some form of regular training in domestic operations. The onus is on the Army to make preparations to assist in emergency preparedness because they are joining the civilian-led effort.²⁹ They are responsible to do so and they are the only agency able to provide the type and quantity of assistance likely to be required.

It is acknowledged that general combat readiness provides the fundamental strength of the Canadian Army. However, just as units preparing to deploy on peacekeeping missions must conduct mission specific training to enable

them to be ready for all tasks, so too should all units in Canada conduct domestic operations training. In a like manner the Army should recognize the requirement for specific training for domestic operations and implement it. Rather than dismissing all training short of war fighting the Army should embed specific portions of domestic operations into the training cycle. Training for domestic operations does not suggest a reduction in the Army's war fighting capability or training. It would, however, ensure a more efficient response to a Canadian defence priority.

Critics fear that training for domestic operations will somehow detract from war fighting preparations, or that adding another training requirement will weaken or reduce the Army's combat capability. Both of these assumptions are false. Units deploying on peace support missions conduct mission specific humanitarian training and combat training. One type of training does not diminish the other. Rather, they enhance the unit's ability to conduct the whole spectrum of operations. Modern employment of Canadian soldiers has evolved to the point where they are often in situations of increasing complexity. The reality is that future conflict will likely include soldiers conducting a wide range of tasks ranging from war fighting, to peace enforcement, to humanitarian assistance. The wisdom of training soldiers on a regular basis for all these tasks is that it will help in the transition from fighting to assistance type operations. Instead of detracting from combat capability it can provide soldiers with the mental agility to rapidly adjust from one task to another. This is particularly relevant given the Canadian experience in both the Former Republic of Yugoslavia and Somalia, where soldiers were often enforcing peace in some areas while providing humanitarian assistance in others. The dramatic change in tempo and mindset required to properly conduct this transition should not be quickly dismissed. It could be argued that training soldiers in the complete spectrum of operations is one way of accomplishing the multi-purpose aspect necessary for combat soldiers.

The cost of adding more training requirements to an already overtasked Army is a potential concern. The danger exists that adding more training could further erode the funds and time available for current training. Can the additional money be found when budgets have been constantly shrinking? Indeed, this is a problem and it is unlikely any additional money will become available. However, training for domestic operations is far cheaper than conventional operations, because there is no expensive ammunition required. As such, perhaps the training could be incorporated in current training plans with the theory portion being taught in garrison and the practical application portion conducted in a nearby urban or local training area. The critical training is the coordination with local officials and

agencies by key unit personnel. The aim would be to clarify responsibilities, the mechanics of the tasks and legal issues. Short duration deployments to test capabilities and reactions to problems would round out the preparation. The theory portion of training could be completed in garrison at minimal cost and the practical exercises could be included into scheduled field training exercises. The expense would be small in comparison to the value of the training and the overall readiness achieved. Given the relative low cost of this training and the high likelihood of actual deployment to help citizens, it would be hard to justify not preparing for domestic emergencies. Plans that are not actively tested to meet the realities of human interaction are likely to become irrelevant. Plans may appear sound but the test of any plan is in the execution. The deficiency of having plans without exercising them should be changed.

CONCLUSION

Domestic operations have been a frequent mission for the Canadian Forces, yet the Army has chosen not to train for this type of operation. The current official position reflects the notion that multi-purpose combat training will meet all needs. This is a dated premise that fails to acknowledge that OOTW are often difficult, complicated and require specific skills that are not exercised in war fighting training. The addition of training for domestic operations will not hamper or weaken the Army's war fighting ability, on the contrary, it will provide commanders who are more mentally agile and soldiers who are able to readily transition from war fighting to humanitarian relief, a phenomenon common in modern conflict. Additional benefits include building working relationships with all levels of government, NGOs, civil agencies and citizens of Canada. As noted in the 1994 White Paper, part of the military's duty is to be prepared for domestic operations. Further, the onus to implement change in current training policy rests clearly on the military because it must join the civilian-led effort to respond to any crises. A prudent policy would be to incorporate mission specific training that is similar to that presently conducted by units deploying abroad on UN missions. This would provide a standard baseline of training for all units and ensure a higher state of readiness for time sensitive domestic operations. In short, units would be better trained to respond to the two most frequent operational tasks that they receive: peace support and domestic operations.

The cost of this training will have to be incorporated into the present budget. This is a problem, but in relative terms domestic training is not as resource intensive as combat training. The inclusion of this training will also increase the time required to complete unit training. However, incorporating the theory portion into garrison training and the practical

portion into field training exercises should minimize its impact. I am not suggesting the reduction of our war fighting capability or training but the implementation of a policy that includes domestic operations training. Put simply, we need to practice our ability to respond to domestic operations by regular training.

The inclusion of regular training in domestic operations does not mean a change in focus from preparing a multi-purpose combat capable force ready to defend Canada's national interests. What it does do is provide Canadians with a more effective Army ready to respond to the inevitable natural and man-made disasters, internal security threats and upheaval that strike all nations in the course of time.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To implement policy change direction must originate from the government and National Defence Headquarters.³⁰ It is recommend the following action be taken:

- review government domestic operations policy and requirements;
- create a national domestic operations training policy that acknowledges preparatory training is necessary;
- establish joint doctrine for the conduct of domestic operations;
- implement on a trial basis a minimum of one domestic operations exercise in each Land Area to develop standard operating procedures and identify training deficiencies within the Land Force Areas;
- incorporate into the above exercises the participation of the National Joint Headquarters and senior levels of federal and provincial governments; and
- implement a Land Force Training Directive that includes specific guidance on domestic operational tasks that area and brigades shall conduct training during annual training.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

A Red Sea Rising, *The Flood of the Century*, Winnipeg, Manitoba: The Winnipeg Free Press, 1997.

Canada, Department of National Defence, "1 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group, Operation Assistance Post Operation Report—Phase 2, Preparation," 16 June 1997,

The 1994 Defence White Paper, Ottawa: DND Canada, 1994.

B-GG-005-004/AF-00, *Canadian Forces Operations*, Ottawa: DND Canada, 1996.

B-GL-300-001/FP-000, *The Conduct of Land Operations—Operational Level Doctrine for the Canadian Army*, Ottawa: DND Canada, 1996.

Lessons Learned from Recent Peace Support /Humanitarian Operations, A Canadian Discussion paper prepared for the Halifax Conference on peace support operations and humanitarian action, 8–10 August 1997, (Ottawa, Ontario: Department of Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1997).

"Operation Assistance Lessons Learned," Major R.E. Hook, ed., *Dispatches*, Volume 4 No 4, (January 1998), Kingston: The Army Lessons Learned Centre.

"Operation Assistance—Lessons Learned Staff Directive." NDHQ, DCDS 301-2-4-2 (J3 Lessons Learned 2), dated 15 November 1997.

P. LaRose-Edwards, J. Dangerfield, and R. Weekes. *Non-Traditional Military for Canadian Peacekeepers: A study prepared for the Commission of Inquiry of Canadian Forces in Somalia*. Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1997.

Yates, Lawrence. "Military Stability and Support Operations: Analogies, Patterns and Recurring Themes." *US Army Command and General Staff College Military Review* LXXVII, Number 4, (July–August 1997).

UNPUBLISHED MATERIAL:

Mr Art Eggleton, Minister of National Defence, *CANFORGEN 020/98*, dated 251326Z Feb 1998.

INTERVIEWS:

Telephone interviews with the operations staff of units, brigades, areas, and National Defence Headquarters DCDS Plans and Operations staff. March 1998.

Colonel W. Semianiw, former Commanding Officer of 1st Battalion Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry 1995–97. 28 March 1998.

ENDNOTES

1. This paper was written during the author's attendance at the Canadian Forces Command and Staff College in 1997–98. While some of the details may be dated, the concepts remain relevant and critical for future domestic operations. The editor, on behalf of Commander, 33 Canadian Brigade Group, thanks LCol Brennan for allowing its inclusion in this volume.
2. Mr Art Eggleton, Minister of National Defence, *CANFORGEN 020/98*, dated 51326Z Feb 1998, referring to the ice storm that struck Ontario and Quebec.
3. Domestic operations are operations to aid in the maintenance of public order and security (Aid to Civil Power), emergency relief and the pursuit of national development goals through the provision of armed or unarmed assistance to civil authorities (Aid to Civil Authority). In domestic operations, the CF complement and supplement civil authorities until such time as the civil authorities can resume normal activities. See Canada, Department of National Defence, B-GL-300-001/FP-000, *The Conduct of Land Operations- Operational Level Doctrine for the Canadian Army*, (Ottawa: DND, 1996): 1–2.
4. The Army classifies its activities during peace and conflict other than war as operations other than war.
5. The theory of OOTW is now covered during Army officer training courses at the Canadian Land Force Command and Staff College. P. LaRose-Edwards, J. Dangerfield and R. Weekes, *Non-Traditional Military for Canadian Peacekeepers: A study prepared for the Commission of Inquiry of Canadian Forces in Somalia*, (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1997): 83.
6. An observation noted by Colonel W. Semianiw, Commanding Officer of 1st Battalion Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, referring to his experiences in dealing with officials during the 1997 Red River Flood. Telephone interview with author, 28 March 1998.
7. Canada, DND, *1994 Defence White Paper*, (Ottawa: DND, 1994): 16.
8. Operation ASSISTANCE was the Manitoba Red River flood relief effort in April–May 1997. It was an Aid to Civil Authority operation that involved approximately 8500 CF personnel, 2850 vehicles, 131 watercraft and 34 aircraft drawn from across the country.
9. DND, *Conduct of Land Operations*: 1–2.
10. Canada, DND, B-GG-005-004/AF-00, *Canadian Forces Operations*, (Ottawa: DND, 1996): 2.
11. Confirmed by a telephone interview with DCDS J3 Plans 2 on 17 April 1998.
12. Confirmation that there are no training directives on domestic operations for all Army Headquarters was obtained by telephone interviews with the operations staff of units, brigades, areas, and National Defence Headquarters DCDS plans and operations staff.
13. DND, *1994 Defence White Paper*: 8.
14. In the past year, Op ASSISTANCE and Op RECUPERATION involved more than 25,000 CF personnel.
15. Lawrence Yates, "Military Stability and Support Operations: Analogies, Patterns and Recurring Themes," *US Army Command and General Staff College Military Review*,

LXXVII, Number 4, (July–August 1997): 51.

16. Canada, DND, “Operation Assistance—Lessons Learned Staff Directive,” NDHQ DCDS file 301-2-4-2 (J3 Lessons Learned 2), 15 November 1997: 6.

17. Canada, DND, “1 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group, Operation Assistance Post Operation Report—Phase 2, Preparation,” 16 June 1997: 3.

18. Canada, DND, “Operation Assistance Lessons Learned,” Major R.E. Hook, ed., *Dispatches*, Volume 4

No 4, (January 1998), (Kingston: The Army Lessons Learned Centre): 23.

19. DND, “Operation Assistance Lessons Learned”: 27.

20. Ibid.

21. Presently the Army conducts no riot or crowd control training unless required for a UN mission. This raises the question how and when would field units prepare themselves for any such crises in Canada?

22. LaRose-Edwards, et al: 83.

23. A common saying in Army circles, the originator is unknown.

24. DND, “Operation Assistance Lessons Learned”: 16.

25. DND, *Conduct of Land Operations*: 10–12.

26. Ibid: 16.

27. *A Red Sea Rising: The Flood of the Century*, Winnipeg: The Winnipeg Free Press, 1997: 65. These comments refer to the public perception of the Canadian Forces during Operation Assistance.

28. DND, “Operation Assistance Lessons Learned”: 17.

29. Recommendations follow the top down approach as suggested in LaRose-Edwards, et al: 83.

30. *Lessons Learned from Recent Peace Support /Humanitarian Operations*, A Canadian discussion paper prepared for the Halifax Conference on peace support operations and humanitarian action, 8–10 August 1997, (Ottawa: Department of Public Works, 1997): 10.

TRAINING ON RULES OF ENGAGEMENT IN DOMESTIC OPERATIONS

Brigadier-General T.J. Grant¹

PUBLIC VIOLENCE

Canada is considered by many people to be a safe and relatively non-violent country. There have, however, been incidents of public disorder serious enough to require the aid of the military to quell. Although unknown to most Canadians, this country has a list of such events, from the 1885 Riel Rebellion, which effectively united the French and English into one Dominion, through the FLQ Crisis, and on to Oka.²

Although studies of public violence have identified a number of processes playing key roles in such outbreaks, there is no single or dominant trigger.³ This does little to prepare the Canadian Forces for possible intervention. It is suggested that public violence is related to changes in social relationships and therefore will continue as society evolves.⁴ It is therefore safe to assume that Canada has not seen the end of public violence or the need to employ the CF within Canada.

This essay will show that the dynamics of civil disorder and violence, combined with the complicated legal framework governing the use of force in Canada, require that soldiers receive specific training prior to engaging in domestic operations. The paper starts by examining several domestic operations that required or allowed the use of force. This is followed by a review of the legal framework governing the use of force in Canada. Finally, suggested training requirements are presented.

One characteristic of almost all major instances of public violence is the involvement of the Army. The Canadian Army has been used to put down rebellions, ethnic confrontations, election violence, strikes, prison violence and terrorism.⁵ The use of the CF in domestic operations continues today, with large portions of the military providing civilian authorities with humanitarian assistance to fight floods, forest fires and ice storms. In the case of the Red River Flood of 1997 and the Ice Storm of 1998, in addition to humanitarian support, assistance to law enforcement agencies was provided.⁶

As the force of last resort, the Army should be requested only after events have exceeded the capability of the civilian authorities.⁷ In such cases, failure

for the Army is not an option. The Army must ensure that the situation is returned to a level compatible with the abilities of the civil authority to manage, at all costs. This could, at times, necessitate the use of deadly force against fellow citizens. This use of military force on behalf of the civil authorities is referred to as Aid of the Civil Power. Aid of the Civil Power is one of four types of support provided during domestic operations. The other three are the local provision of services, assistance to law enforcement agencies and support provided under the *Emergencies Act*.⁸

Legislation ensures that such use of the military is anything but simple. In Canada, principally federal statutes contained in the *Criminal Code of Canada* govern the use of force. Meanwhile, under the *Canada Act*, the provinces are responsible for the maintenance of public order.⁹ The authority which allows the provision of armed assistance to civil authorities is found in the *National Defence Act (NDA)*, the *Emergencies Act* and several Orders in Council. To complicate matters, soldiers' conduct remains largely governed by *Queen's Regulations and Orders*.

The instrument of the application of force in Aid of the Civil Power is usually a soldier, armed with a personal weapon, operating under the supervision of the military chain of command. As this employment is considerably different from normal war-fighting, it is incumbent upon military leadership to ensure that all soldiers are properly prepared for the possibility of using deadly force against their fellow citizens. At the present they are not.

DOMESTIC OPERATIONS

Members of the Canadian Forces often carry loaded weapons in the performance of their duty. Rigorous training is undertaken both in weapons handling and the circumstances under which members can use their weapons. The execution of these duties, however, is more often than not performed outside Canada, in circumstances where any use of force is unlikely to face the same detailed examination as if that force had been used in Canada against Canadians.¹⁰ To complicate matters, rules governing the use of force vary between international and domestic operations. From an individual point of view these differences are important.

Two recent domestic operations will show that Canadian soldiers were not fully prepared to fulfil their duties as peace officers. These operations were Operation SALON (the Oka crisis) and Operation ASSISTANCE (the Red River flood). The Oka crisis saw soldiers placed in a volatile situation with little preparation and no rules of engagement. During the Red River Flood, CF elements performed "low level tasks in support of law enforcement operations—without authority."¹¹

In the late-1980s, events conspired to create a tense and dangerous situation on a number of Indian reservations south of Montreal. The main issues were gambling and smuggling. Events came to a head in the summer of 1990, when Mohawk “Warriors” moved to protect gambling activities in Kahnawake, and the town of Oka challenged the Kanesatake reserve’s claim against land wanted for a golf course.¹² A stand-off between police and an estimated 50 to 70 heavily armed hard-core members of the Warrior Society followed; native actions included barricades and bridge closures. The Army was committed on 17 August, having been warned to prepare for operations one week earlier. They were given four tasks: remove barricades at both sites, restore freedom of movement across the Mercier Bridge, remove military-style strong points and restore public order and security. These tasks had been discussed and agreed to by the provincial government prior to the official request for assistance.¹³

The troops committed to this operation received no rules of engagement or training for the situations in which they would be authorised to use deadly force.¹⁴ The Chief of the Defence Staff, General John de Chastelain, decided at the start of the crisis that the military would follow two fundamental principles. These were first, that only minimum force would be used, and second, that any use of force would have to be initiated by the Mohawks.¹⁵ Lieutenant-General Kent Foster, the Commander of the Army and the Region commander, announced these limitations to the press. He stated that the Army would not be the first to use force to resolve the situation. In effect, he stated that a soldier would be the first to “take a bullet.”¹⁶ Brigadier-General Armand Roy, the Brigade Commander, blamed the standing legislation (i.e.—NDA’s requirement for minimum force) for this decision that a soldier be shot first.¹⁷ In this belief, General Roy was incorrect. In the CF manual, *Canadian Forces Operations*, under the heading of Negotiations and Warnings, the following is provided: “While in no way negating the inherent right of self-defence and without assuming an unacceptable tactical risk, commanders should make every effort to control the situation through measures short of using force, including the use of personal contact and negotiation.”¹⁸

This statement shows that given the regulations extant in 1990, force could have been used at Oka and that the soldiers’ right to self-defence would have allowed them to take action on an individual basis. This is supported by the *Criminal Code*, which states in part “Every one is justified in using force to defend himself or any one under his protection from assault, if he uses no more force than is necessary to prevent the assault or the repetition of it.”¹⁹ This is not to say, however, that the decision to restrict each soldier’s right to use force was not correct. Based on the strategic end-

state desired by the government and considering the protection offered to each soldier by their equipment, vehicles, and defensive works, the decision to allow the natives to use force first was sound.

In the spring of 1997, severe flooding along the Red River resulted in the call out of the Canadian Forces to assist provincial authorities in Manitoba. The formal request for assistance was received on 19 April 1997 and support was provided starting on 21 April 1997.²⁰ “What started out as a request for one hundred soldiers to help fill sandbags quickly escalated within two weeks to a Joint Force operation involving approximately 8,500 CF personnel, 2,850 vehicles, 131 water craft and 34 aircraft drawn from across the entire country.”²¹ Initially, support included satellite surveillance of the flood waters, strategic airlift to bring troops and equipment to the flood zone, movement control of ground forces, construction and maintenance of dikes and the transport by helicopters and boats of law enforcement and government officials within the flood area.

It was this final task that concerned senior commanders on the ground. The very fact that soldiers, albeit unarmed, were in the company of law enforcement officials was seen as a provision of Aid of the Civil Power. As such, Major-General Jeffries, the Joint Force Commander, did two things. First, he asked NDHQ for rules of engagement in order to protect his soldiers. Second, he attempted to convince the provincial leaders that they should officially ask for support under “Part XI, Aid of the Civil Power,” of the NDA. The Honourable V.E Toews, Attorney General of Manitoba, did so on 2 May 1998.²² In his letter he specifically stated that all assistance provided must be from unarmed troops. This caveat was probably based on the perception of the civilian leaders that armed assistance equated to martial law.²³ This of course is not the case. The powers that one would associate with martial law are found in the *Emergencies Act*. It is only under the provisions of this Act, which is vague as to the military’s actual role, that one could see “directly engaged in support of law enforcement operations.”²⁴ This is based on the premise that any situation requiring the proclamation of the *Emergencies Act* would be by its nature extreme and exceptional.²⁵

The request for assistance combined with a refusal from NDHQ to provide rules of engagement for the operation caused some difficulties for the Joint Force Commander.²⁶ NDHQ advised that soldiers were only authorised to use force in self-defence to protect themselves or law enforcement personnel.²⁷ Major-General Jeffries subsequently provided guidance on support to provincial law enforcement, stating that although all soldiers now enjoyed the powers of a peace officer, they were to refrain from exercising

the powers to arrest, detain, or search civilians. In addition, he emphasised that all support would be provided by unarmed soldiers; he specifically prohibited military police personnel, who were armed, from assisting civilian police.²⁸ This Commander's Guidance included several scenarios designed to prepare soldiers for their new tasks. This direction was minimal at best and probably matched the threat at the time. However a change in the threat level, which was anticipated in the worst case scenario, could have left soldiers in dangerous situations for which they were not equipped or prepared.

In the end, the main concerns of the military were that unarmed soldiers would be tasked with "some of the more confrontational functions of a police officer," or they would have to refuse to "perform the mandated responsibilities of a police officer"—the first situation placing them at greater risk; the latter situation leaving them increasingly liable to civil prosecution.²⁹ To avoid such scenarios, Major-General Jeffries wrote to the Chief of Winnipeg Police Services and the Commanding Officer of D Division the RCMP (Manitoba), explaining the situation and providing the same guidance that he had issued to his own chain of command. The police would therefore not expect military support that could not be made available.³⁰

While soldiers were called out to support the civil authority in Oka and Winnipeg, in neither case were they provided with adequate rules of engagement or an explanation of their duties and responsibilities as peace officers. Although nothing untoward occurred in either case it could have. A review of the incidents at Kent State shows the possible effects of using an armed force in domestic operations.

Kent State is one of four large public universities in Ohio that experienced student violence in the spring of 1970.³¹ The student demonstrations against the war in Vietnam that occurred from 1 to 4 May were not unique to Kent State, however the military response certainly was. Events began on the evening of 1 May with students rioting in the bar district of the town of Kent, resulting in broken windows and a large bonfire.³² At the same time, three companies of Ohio State National Guardsmen were dealing with a labour strike by truck drivers to the west of Kent. These Guardsmen were well trained—many for duty in Vietnam. As well, most had experience in civil disorder, in that the previous two years saw some 8,000 Ohio Guardsmen called out to deal with race riots, student disorder, and penitentiary riots.³³ That week's trucker strike shows that the Guardsmen were properly briefed for their duties and executed them in a professional manner.³⁴ That particular walkout ended in a peaceful manner.

The situation at Kent State continued to fluctuate during the weekend. The request for Guardsmen came at 17:27 on Saturday 2 May.³⁵ That night, students on campus burned the Army ROTC building. By Sunday, however, things had calmed considerably; by mid-afternoon Sunday the campus had taken on a carnival atmosphere, with soldiers, students, and citizens mixing freely.³⁶

By noon on Monday everything would change again. Although gatherings on campus had been banned, thousands of students were in the vicinity of the Victory Bell at lunchtime.³⁷ In dispersing the crowd, 28 Guardsmen fired a total of 55 rounds resulting in the deaths of four students and the wounding of a further nine.³⁸ No legal proceedings were taken against the Guardsmen, based on Ohio statutes allowing that members of the Guard, when suppressing, dispersing or apprehending rioters “are guiltless for killing, maiming, or injuring a rioter as a consequence of the use of such force.”³⁹ It was never clear if an order to fire was given. However, there is a strong belief among some that the lives of the Guardsmen were in danger that day. Regardless of why the shooting started, it is clear that the situation deteriorated rapidly. When faced with difficult and volatile situations, even trained troops can take actions that have dire results and consequences.

These three cases show that force remains an option in controlling civil disobedience in the assistance of law enforcement agencies. They also show that military troops are often placed into difficult situations on short notice. The results of these three events were very different. Kent State ended in the death of several students and no legal action against the soldiers. The stand off at Oka ended peacefully, yet if anyone was to be killed or wounded it was sure to have been a soldier. Finally, in Winnipeg, although the military was seen as the saviour of the day, soldiers were placed in potentially dangerous positions without all of the legal protection to which they were entitled. All cases clearly show that everyone who is involved in domestic operations must be aware of the legal framework in which they operate.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK

There is a substantial legal framework advising the CF in Domestic Operations. Lieutenant-Colonel Ken Watkin, a military lawyer, has written that any discussion begins with a review of the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms*, suggesting that section 7 of the *Charter* can be interpreted to mean, “in order for soldiers to gain the protections and justifications offered by the law, they must ensure that they operate according to the law.”⁴⁰ While the lawyers may start at the *Charter*, the start point for members of the Canadian Forces should be the *National Defence Act*.⁴¹ Part XI of the *Act* provides the legal basis for provision of armed support to the provinces for

the maintenance of public order. Specifically, service must be provided: “in any case in which a riot or disturbance of the peace, beyond the powers of the civil authorities to suppress, prevent or deal with and requiring that service, occurs or is, in the opinion of an attorney general, considered as likely to occur.”⁴²

The Act allows the Chief of the Defence Staff to decide the scope and nature of the support that is provided.⁴³ The Act also contains the Code of Service Discipline, a set of laws that governs the conduct of all members of the Armed Forces. The other set of laws that governs members of the Canadian Forces is of course the *Criminal Code of Canada*; soldiers on domestic operations will be held accountable in accordance with the *Criminal Code* and the additional offences listed in the *National Defence Act*.

Queen’s Regulations and Orders supplement the *National Defence Act*. Chapter 23 of *Queen’s Regulations and Orders* expands upon Part XI of the *National Defence Act*. Clear direction is given with regard to how the Chief of the Defence Staff must respond to a request to call out the Canadian Forces and how those forces will be controlled. While called out in Aid of the Civil Power, members of the military will have “all of the powers and duties of constables . . . but they shall act only as a military body and are individually liable to obey the orders of their superior officers,” a phrase designed to protect individuals with the power of a constable while ensuring that they will not act directly for the civil authority.⁴⁴ The powers of a constable equate to the powers of a peace officer, which protects CF members from criminal and civil liability while enforcing the law, even if force is used while so doing.⁴⁵ These legal phrases are fine. However, there is some doubt as to whether a soldier or officer would know how to interpret these phrases or what their impact would be on individual members of the military.

Being called out under Part XI is but one way in which soldiers can acquire the powers of a peace officer. As Lieutenant-Colonel Watkin explains, changes in the *Criminal Code* in July 1976 allowed for peace officer status in the performance of certain duties, such as the maintenance or restoration of law and order and the apprehension of persons who have escaped from lawful custody or confinement.⁴⁶ Chapter 22 of *Queen’s Regulations and Orders*, “Military Police and Reports on Persons in Custody,” further states “It must be noted that members of the Canadian Forces, other than officers and non-commissioned members appointed as military police, are only peace officers where they are performing the duties . . . as a result of a specific order . . . therefore, members cannot assume for themselves the status of peace officers simply by performing such a duty . . .”⁴⁷

Although the Canadian Forces is legally authorised to use force, up to and including deadly force in some circumstances, there are limits to its powers. The limits are contained in the *Criminal Code of Canada*. The fundamental tenet of the *Criminal Code* regarding the use of force is that “every one who is authorized to use force is criminally responsible for any excess thereof,” and any force must be the minimum necessary given the circumstances.⁴⁸ While the *Criminal Code* provides direction on the application of force in certain circumstances such as the apprehension of fleeing suspects and the protection of property, even this is further expanded upon through case law, wherein various courts, including the Supreme Court of Canada, have provided legally binding opinions. One such case is based on the phrase “if he [a peace officer] acts on reasonable grounds” found in subsection 25(1) of the *Criminal Code*. While space precludes going into specifics, for our troops it means that “a soldier cannot act on speculation but rather must base his actions on what the ‘ordinary, prudent and cautious man’ might do in the same circumstances.”⁴⁹ The actions of a soldier will not only be subject to close scrutiny by the public and the media, but will be examined in minute detail by the Canadian legal system.

The *Criminal Code* limits the use of force in some cases while permitting it in others. Section 27 allows “every one is justified in using as much force as is reasonably necessary:

- to prevent the commission of an offence:
 - for which, if it were committed, the person who committed it might be arrested without warrant; and
 - that would be likely to cause immediate and serious injury to the person or property of anyone; or
- to prevent anything being done that, on reasonable grounds, he believes would, if it were done, be an offence mentioned in paragraph (a).”⁵⁰

Between the legal language of the Code and the clarification of case law, it is unlikely that any soldier can operate comfortably on domestic operations without specific training in this area—a contention supported by the manual *Use of Force in CF Operations*.⁵¹ To operate effectively during domestic operations, there are several important questions that a soldier should be able to answer. For example, what crimes fall into the category of arrest without a warrant? What are reasonable grounds? What is a manifestly unlawful order? A soldier lacking ready answers to these questions requires training in the rules governing the use of force in Canada.

CURRENT TRAINING

At present, only the Navy and Joint Task Force 2 conduct training on rules of engagement for domestic operations. The Army conducts no training for domestic operations, even though it is a mandated task in the 1994 White Paper. This Army policy is based on the belief that training for high-intensity combat operations adequately prepares soldiers for domestic operations.⁵² Due to the special nature of Joint Task Force 2 and the circumstances in which that unit would be employed, it will not be discussed further. However, the Navy's philosophy with regards to boarding parties is germane to this issue.

Naval boarding parties fill two roles. The first is in support of fisheries officers inspecting foreign fishing vessels in Canadian waters. In this capacity, naval personnel assist in the enforcement of the *Fisheries Act*, which authorizes arrest, inspection, search and the use of disabling fire.⁵³ The second role is the enforcement of United Nations' mandated embargoes. Regardless of the rationale for employment, all Canadian warships have a boarding party, in which all members are trained in weapons handling, rules of engagement and engagement scenarios. The boarding party will have been assessed as part of the ship's work-ups, a pre-requisite for being deemed operational.⁵⁴

The Canadian Forces' *Use of Force* manual provides some direction on training required for domestic operations, although it is neither clear nor specific. Chapter 3, "Use of Force in Domestic Operations," contains no discussion of ROE training beyond there being a requirement for rules of engagement, nor is there an indication of the standards required for rules of engagement training.⁵⁵

NDHQ Instruction DCDS 2/98 also provides vague direction to the Commanders on conducting training for domestic operations. It states in part, "force generators are responsible for conducting use of force training . . . as judged necessary and prudent . . . and with strict emphasis on the policy and legal limitations which apply . . ."⁵⁶ This could be interpreted to mean that if training was deemed to be necessary then the legal aspects of the use of force would be covered. However, the decision to undertake that training is not a certainty. Annex C to DCDS Instruction 2/98 explains that one of the duties of the Chief of the Defence Staff is to order rules of engagement for domestic operations.⁵⁷

Units preparing for international operations receive ROEs and directives from appropriate NDHQ desk officers, which include any CDS restrictions on Coalition policies. Detailed briefings and scenario training follow for all

deploying members. This training is vital to ensure that all soldiers are familiar with the rules of engagement and any confusion or weakness within the rules is exposed.⁵⁸ Yet similar training is not conducted for domestic operations where the potential legal liability to our soldiers is greater.

CONSTRUCTED SELF-DEFENCE

Military experience in Winnipeg and Oka leads to the appearance that rules of engagement and the full powers of a peace officer are not required in Canada, with senior CF leadership apparently believing that the right to self-defence will provide sufficient protection to soldiers. This idea has at times expanded into the concept of constructed self-defence, wherein the defence of property allows for lethal force if the soldier's actions fall within the self-defence section of the *Criminal Code*.⁵⁹ That is, if they place themselves between the perpetrator of a crime and the intended target they will then be protecting themselves and not the person or property at risk.

An example of this concept is a soldier guarding a weapons shipment. Under Canadian law, deadly force cannot be used to protect property, even if that property is a shipment of restricted weapons. However, if the guard places him- or herself between the thief and the weapons, then the soldier can claim self-defence and as a result use reasonable force to protect him- or herself. As a consequence, the soldier will at the same time be protecting the weapons. In addition, it must be clear that any use of force in self-defence can only be justified if that force is the minimum amount necessary and was not intended to cause death or serious injury.⁶⁰

Such a theory of constructed self-defence, while appearing to be the easy way out for the Department of National Defence, potentially places Canadian soldiers at unnecessary risk. The law was written to provide the powers of a peace officer to soldiers when called upon to replace peace officers in situations where civil authorities could no longer cope. In such cases, soldiers would benefit from the powers and responsibilities of those they replaced.

TRAINING REQUIREMENT

Soldiers must know the circumstances in which force may, and more importantly, those in which force may not be used. They must know the duties and responsibilities of a peace officer and the assistance a peace officer can demand of others in the execution of those duties. Finally, all soldiers must understand their inherent right of self-defence, and its limitations, and when that right can be overruled by the military chain of command. The only way in which soldiers can acquire this knowledge is through structured training. "Waiting for a crisis situation . . . would be too

late.”⁶¹ The training needed is similar to that justifiably necessary for international peace support operations.

Soldiers must be given the legal basis for the operations in which they are about to participate. They must understand certain legal principles such as: protection of persons and property, self-defence, minimum force, powers and responsibilities of a peace officer and accountability for individual actions. Soldiers must be given clear rules of engagement and have an opportunity to discuss those rules in detail. Finally, scenarios must be used to ensure that the rules are understood and that there is no doubt in the minds of the soldiers as to how the rules are to be applied. This format works extremely well for international operations. However, it took the incidents in Somalia to force this structured training into the Canadian Forces. Today’s soldiers are better educated than ever before. Soldiers have shown that they have the intellectual ability to operate under complicated rules of engagement, on international operations, where the defence of certain property is allowed. There is no reason to believe that they could not comprehend the nuances of Canadian law.

There are serious consequences awaiting the Canadian Forces as well as individual soldiers if force is improperly applied during a domestic operation. The Canadian Forces would likely face the same level of scrutiny as was seen during the Somalia Investigation. This would be nothing compared to the position in which a soldier would find him- or herself. Removed from the military justice system, the soldier would be prosecuted by civilian courts in Canada. If a soldier used force inappropriately because of a lack of necessary training, who would be responsible? Clearly, individuals remain responsible for their own actions, however how would the chain of command react to its failings. It is the duty of the chain of command to adequately prepare soldiers prior to operations, be they international or domestic. To do otherwise places our soldiers and the chain of command in a morally indefensible position.

CONCLUSION

Canada’s history contains many instances of public disorder and violence; contemporary theories of civil disobedience and hostility give us every reason to believe that we have not seen the end of such activities. The military response to Aid of the Civil Power requests has been inconsistent, with soldiers committed to situations featuring great potential for violence without the proper training or rules of engagement. Fortunately no serious problems have yet occurred.

However, Somalia and Kent State remain as examples of the possible dire

consequences of the use of force, although for very different reasons. Such events are preventable—proper training and rules of engagement allow soldiers to perform admirably in demanding and tense situations. This requirement is clearly stated in the *CF Operations* manual:

It must be recognized that members of the CF generally lack the in-depth knowledge and training in terms of the *Criminal Code* and other legislation that professional peace-enforcement officers have. The use of force directive issued to a TFC [Task Force Commander] of a domestic operation must therefore contain comprehensive and specific direction concerning the legal and political underpinnings for the use of force. In particular, numbered ROE providing for both the use of non-deadly force and, if appropriate, deadly force must be issued.

The primary goal of Canada's use of force doctrine and ROE architecture is to provide direction on the use of force that is clear, concise, precise and comprehensive [...] The ROE Authorization message [...] requires that a Commander and the force are well versed and trained [with] the standard Canadian definitions, principles and concepts on self-defence [...] *The Use of Force Directive* is a comprehensive mission specific document which contains use of force definitions, principles and concepts, direction on self-defence, the authorized numbered ROE for a particular mission and any other direction concerning the use of force for a particular operation.⁶²

Soldiers have shown the ability to apply complicated rules of engagement in high-profile operations in the Balkans and Haiti. We should expect no less from them in Canada.

Time is not on our side. For the Canadian Forces to be prepared to assist civil authorities, training should be formalised and structured on the model presently used to prepare for international operations. Additional training would be required to educate soldiers on the legal nuances and issues identified by military legal officers, particularly the use of force to protect property and the concepts of self-defence. Such training eliminates a critical shortfall in preparing soldiers to execute their duties during domestic operations.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Babington, Anthony. *Military Intervention in Britain*. London: Routledge, 1990.
- Bland, Douglas. *Chiefs of Defence: Government and the Unified Command of the Canadian Armed Forces*. Toronto: Brown Book Company, 1995.
- Brennan, Major Shane, "Train for Domestic Operations." Canadian Forces College, Exercise New Horizons, 1998.
- Canada, *Dishonoured Legacy: The Lessons of the Somalia Affair*. Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1997.
- Canada, DND. "Canadian Forces Operations." Ottawa: DND, 15 August 2005.
- "Op ASSISTANCE Lessons Learned." *Dispatches*. Kingston: Army Lessons Learned Centre, January 1998.
- "Op Assistance Post Operation Report." Ottawa: DND, July 1997.
- "Use of Force in CF Operations." Ottawa: DND, June 2001.
- Higham, Robin, ed. *Bayonets in the Street*. Yuma: Sunflower UP, 1969.
- Maloney, Sean M. "Domestic Operations: The Canadian Approach." *Parameters*, Autumn 1997: 135-152.
- Michener, James A. *Kent State, What Happened and Why*. New York: Random House, 1971.
- Morton, Desmond. *A Military History of Canada*. Edmonton: Hurtig Publishers, 1990.
- Philips, Guy R. "Rules of Engagement: A Primer." *The Army Lawyer*, Jul. 1993: 4-27.
- Roy, Brigadier-General J.A. "Op SALON." *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, Apr 1991: 15-19.
- Rule, James. *Theories of Civil Violence*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988.
- Torrance, Judy. *Public Violence in Canada*. Kingston: McGill-Queen's UP, 1986.
- Watkin, K.W. "Legal Aspects of Internal Security: a Soldier's Protections and Obligations, Part I." *Canadian Forces JAG Journal*, Volume 1, 1986: 51-79.
- "Legal Aspects of Internal Security: a Soldier's Protections and Obligations Part II." *Canadian Forces JAG Journal*, Volume 2, 1988: 5-30.

UNPUBLISHED MATERIAL:

Herfst, Lieutenant-Colonel B. Presentation to Advanced Military Studies Course I, Canadian Forces College, 8 October 1998.

INTERVIEWS:

Colonel J. Morneau, G3 5 GBMC, Op Salon, 17 September 1998.

Mr J.G. Taylor, Manager Preparedness, Emergency Measures Ontario, 21 October 1998.

LETTERS:

Attorney General of Manitoba to Solicitor General of Canada, 2 May 1997.

Commander Joint Task Force to Subordinate Commanders, 3 May 1997.

Commander Joint Task Force to Police Chiefs, 3 May 1997.

ENDNOTES

1. A much-expanded version of this paper was written by then-Colonel Grant as a research essay during Advanced Military Studies Course I, at the Canadian Forces College, in November 1998. While some details may be dated, the concepts remain relevant and critical for future domestic operations. The editor, on behalf of the Commander, 33 Canadian Brigade Group, wishes to thank BGen Grant for allowing its inclusion.
2. Desmond Morton, *A Military History of Canada*. (Edmonton: Hurtig Publishers, 1990): 101.
3. James Rule, *Theories of Civil Violence*. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988): 268.
4. Ibid: 266.
5. Judy Torrance, *Public Violence in Canada*. (Kingston: McGill-Queen's UP, 1986): Appendix.
6. Canada, DND, "Operation Assistance Lessons Learned," *Dispatches*, Vol. 4, No. 4, (January 1998), Kingston: Army Lessons Learned Centre: 23. Interview with J.G. Taylor, Manager, Emergency Preparedness Ontario, 21 October 1998. During the Ice Storm assistance was requested by and approved for the law enforcement agencies in Quebec, but not in Ontario. This caused confusion in Ontario as some police, military and civil authorities, on seeing the Prime Minister discuss the matter on TV, believed that blanket approval for assistance to the police in both provinces had been granted.
7. *National Defence Act R.S., c. N-5, 1985, Sect. 279*. This section provides an example request for military assistance for use by a provincial Attorney General. The wording of the request states in part ". . . that a riot or disturbance of the peace beyond the powers of the civil authorities . . ."
8. Canada, DND, "NDHQ Instruction DCDS 2/98: Guidance for the Conduct of Domestic Operations," (Ottawa: DND, 1998): Sect. 5.
9. Torrance: 212.
10. Canada, DND, *Use of Force in CF Operations*. (Ottawa: DND, 2001): Sect. 301.2.
11. DND, *Operation Assistance Lessons Learned*: 23.
12. Sean Maloney, "Domestic Operations: the Canadian Approach." *Parameters*, (Autumn 1997): 145.
13. Interview with Col J. Morneau, 25 Sept 1998.
14. Morneau interview.
15. Douglas Bland, *Chiefs of Defence: Government and the Unified Command of the Canadian Armed Forces*. (Toronto: Brown Book Company, 1995): 199. While not rules of engagement as we would know them today, this guidance from the CDS may have filled the same role during the Oka crisis.
16. Morneau interview.

17. Brigadier-General Roy, "Operation Salon," *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, Vol. 20, No. 5 (April 1991): 17. *National Defence Act*, Part XI.
18. DND, *Canadian Forces Operations*. (Ottawa: DND, 2005): Art. 503.
19. *Criminal Code*. R.S. 1985, c. C-34, Sect. 37(1).
20. DND, "Operation Assistance Lessons Learned": 3.
21. *Ibid*: 1.
22. Letter, Attorney General of Manitoba, 2 May 1997.
23. DND, "Operation Assistance Lessons Learned": 23.
24. DND, *Use of Force*: Sect. 306.
25. DCDS 2/98: Sect. 64.
26. Ivan Taylor "Observations on Operation Assistance from 1 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group." (Ottawa: Joint Staff Operational Research Team, May 1997): para 83.
27. Lieutenant-Colonel B. Herfst, Presentation to Advanced Military Studies Course 1, 8 October 1998. Herfst states that "[s]elf-defence is not a legal authorization to use force . . ." Therefore by the definition of rules of engagement found in the CF manual, "Use of Force in CF Operations," self-defence cannot be considered rules of engagement.
28. Letter, Commander Joint Task Force, 3 May 1997.
29. DND, "Operation Assistance Lessons Learned": 24.
30. Letter, Commander Joint Task Force, 3 May 1997.
31. James A. Michener, *Kent State, What Happened and Why*. (New York: Random House, 1971): 7.
32. *Ibid*: 53, 126.
33. *Ibid*: 229.
34. *Ibid*: 129.
35. *Ibid*: 216.
36. *Ibid*: 255.
37. *Ibid*: 328.
38. *Ibid*: 340.
39. *Ibid*: 411. A further point that deserves mention is the fact that Ohio is one of the few States that allows troops to use live ammunition in the curbing of riots. This is similar to Canadian law which states in the Sect 32 of the *Criminal Code*, "Every peace officer is justified in using or in ordering the use of as much force as the peace officer believes, in good faith and on reasonable grounds, (a) is necessary to suppress a riot . . ."
40. Captain Ken Watkin, "Legal Aspects of Internal Security: A Soldier's Protections and Obligations Part I", *Canadian Forces JAG Journal*, (Volume 1, 1986): 56.
41. Maloney: 136.

42. Canada, *National Defence Act*: Part XI: Sect. 275.
43. Canada, *NDA*: Part XI: sect 278.
44. Canada, *NDA*: sect 282. Canada, *Queen's Regulations & Orders*. Ottawa: undated electronic version: Art. 23.11 note (B).
45. *Criminal Code*, sect 2. DCDS 2/98, F1/1.
46. Watkin: Part I, 59. A complete list of the tasks that would automatically grant the powers of peace officer is contained in this reference.
47. *Queen's Regulations and Orders*: 22.01 note (D).
48. Canada, *Criminal Code*: Sect. 26.
49. See Watkin, Part I, for a complete discussion of the case.
50. Canada, *Criminal Code*: Sect 27.
51. Watkin, Part I, 73, and DND, *Use of Force in CF Operations*: Chap. 3.
52. Major Shane Brennan, *Train for Domestic Operations*, Canadian Forces College, Exercise New Horizons, 1997–98: 3. An edited version is included in this volume.
53. Canada, *Fisheries Act*.
54. Discussion with AMSC I Naval Officers 22 Sep. These officers included Captains (N) J.S. Dewar, J.P.A. Guindon, and Commander D. Rouleau.
55. DND, *Use of Force*: Chapter 1–3, *passim*.
56. DCDS 2/98: Sect. 94.
57. *Ibid*: C3/4.
58. LCdr Guy Philips, "Rules of Engagement: A Primer," *The Army Lawyer*, (Jul 1993): 27.
59. Major Ken Watkin, "Legal Aspects of Internal Security: A Soldier's Protections and Obligations Part II." , (Vol. 2, 1986): 21.

ANNEX A — CONPLAN RAPTOR: LAND FORCES CENTRAL AREA'S GENERAL PLAN FOR THE CONDUCT OF DOMESTIC OPERATIONS

This article provides an overview only of Land Force Central Area's standing contingency plan for domestic operations within the Province of Ontario. Details are available from the chain of command, and should naturally be considered the authoritative source for any issues concerning this contingency plan.

SITUATION

CONPLAN TRILLIUM is the LFCA general contingency response plan to a request for Canadian Forces support to a domestic emergency. CONPLAN TRILLIUM is non-scenario specific and is intended to be utilized primarily as a command and control (C2) template for the deployment of CF personnel and/or equipment in response to requests for support from Canadian civil authorities.

A mission specific threat assessment will be issued prior to the commitment of any CF support. In the context of CF domestic operations, there are two contingencies that could conceivably result in CF involvement:

- (1) A humanitarian disaster, natural or man-made, the magnitude of which overwhelms both the municipal and provincial capacity to manage the situation.
- (2) A disturbance of the peace, the magnitude of which overwhelms provincial and federal law enforcement authorities.

SIT—Higher Comd's Intent

The CF is the resource of last recourse to civil authorities at both the provincial and federal levels.

In taking action to deal with an emergency situation, the advantages the CF brings to a crisis are cohesive C2 and an effective, flexible and responsive organization. The CF is particularly capable of providing logistics, transportation, information gathering and communications support, which can be readily used to support the responsible agency that has jurisdiction over the emergency situation.

It is the intent of the CDS to provide assistance in the form of limited,

essential support to the responsible civil authorities upon request in a time of domestic crisis, with a view to terminating that support as soon as the situation becomes manageable by the responsible civil authority.

MISSION

LFCA will be prepared to assist the civil authorities of the Province of Ontario with the provision of military support to a domestic emergency, the effects of which are beyond the capabilities of the responsible agency to resolve or manage, in order to save lives, prevent human suffering, and mitigate property damage. [Of importance to note in this mission statement is that the domestic emergency must be beyond the capabilities of the responsible agency to manage or resolve, and the unifying purpose links our actions to saving lives and preventing human suffering.]

I intend to support provincial authorities with sufficient 33 CBG resources and advice, limited in scope, capability and duration enabling them to regain the effective management of the crisis. I will adopt a stepped response to requests for support, commencing with liaison, planning, and the provision of support at the lowest levels. Execution will usually be based upon the geographic footprint of the 33 CBG units. The end-state will be achieved when the crisis has stabilized to the point that the civil authorities of Ontario regain effective management of the situation. Operations will be conducted in five phases:

Phase 1—Warning. CCPLOs will monitor the civil situation within their AI and inform 33 CBG HQ G3 of situations that may require a military response.

Phase 2—Preparation. This phase will involve detailed planning, logistical preparations, the development of intelligence products, and the conduct of information operations.

Phase 3—Deployment. Deployment will adhere to a stepped response of minimum necessary support from the lowest levels. Commitment of soldiers will be reserved for situations in which liaison, planning, and logistic support are insufficient to stabilize the crisis.

Phase 4—Employment. A mission specific operation order and subsequent fragmentary orders will govern this Phase.

Phase 5—Redeployment. Redeployment may be characterized by a gradual thinning-out of 33 CBG support.

Phase 5 will conclude with the staffing of Post Operation Reports (POR).

CONCEPT OF OPS: The intent is to avoid direct involvement in a domestic crisis by providing sufficient resources and advice to provincial authorities to enable them to regain the effective management of the situation.

The key role of LFCA is to support the provincial authorities in planning and management within their mandate and responsibility. Physical CF resources, such as equipment and manpower, are always available to some degree, but should be considered as backup and in support to those with the primary mandate, and not as the first line of response for any emergency situation.

33 CBG will establish on paper the capability expected from each of its Unit to be able to field as part of one or up to three Domestic Response Companies (DRCs). Capabilities will be split in three categories: C2, field troops, and specialized sp. On order, 33 CBGHQ will activate a call out procedure to some or all Units, who will then commence local fan out drills with a view to bringing into their Armoury the expected capability listed or more. When appropriate, Comd 33 CBG will group the required capabilities from different Units as tasks dictate and resources are made available

Potential tasks include:

Augment the IRU;

Relief in place; and

Conduct limited independent humanitarian assistance operations.

Tasks Common to all 33 CBG units:

Establish up to date fan-out lists and procedures as directed in COP Raptor;

On activation, report to 33 CBGHQ DO on resources available every hour until deployment; and

On order, force-generate an enhanced response capability.

COMD LFCA INTENT: There is a natural human tendency during crises to turn to the military for assistance; commanders at all levels must guard against self-fulfilling planning and liaison which could result in the de facto commitment of CF resources in the absence of requests based on actual needs. The establishment of effective communications and liaison with civil authorities will ensure that all concerned have a clear understanding of the scope and limits of CF capabilities and the process of seeking CF support.

MAIN EFFORT: Due to the inherently broad range of activities encompassed in a domestic operation, the main effort is likely to shift, and will therefore be redefined, upon the commitment of CF manpower and equipment to a domestic emergency. Initially the main effort will focus on the fielding of an integrated command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) system capable of providing an accurate assessment of the situation, effective liaison, and timely support to the civil authorities.

DESIRED ENDSTATE: The Comd LFCA's desired endstate for any domestic operation will be achieved when the crisis has stabilized to the point that the civil authorities of ONTARIO are no longer overwhelmed and are again capable of effectively managing the situation. This will set the conditions for LFCA to return to a normal posture. The decision to return to a normal posture will be a command decision based on the requirements of the Province of ONTARIO, as assessed by EMO.

GENERAL EXECUTION: LFCA will adopt a stepped response to any request for CF support to a domestic crisis, commencing with liaison, planning, and the provision of support at the lowest levels. It will be a stepped response from the lowest levels feasible, upwards. The execution of most domestic operations will be primarily based upon the geographic footprint defined in ONTARIO by the reserve formations of 31, 32, and 33 CBGs.

The whole of 2 CMBG is potentially available for use in domestic operations; however, when a domestic crisis occurs that requires an immediate CF reaction, 2 CMBG will be prepared to rapidly deploy an Immediate Reaction Unit (IRU) anywhere within the Province of ONTARIO.

The Commander's Reserve will be drawn from the remainder of 2 CMBG not committed to a military operation and will be defined at the onset of a domestic operation.

COORD INSTR

Community Contingency Planning Liaison Officers (CCPLO)!: CCPLOs represent a new capability imbedded within 33 CBGHQ G3 Branch. They are geographically dispersed and are responsible for an AI, which has been aligned with EMO's area of responsibilities. On activation on CON PLAN RAPTOR, CCPLOs will establish liaison with relevant local authorities and act as the main POC between those agencies and Comd 33 CBG. On occasion, CCPLOs might be detached to local commanders.

33 CBG has been allocated 10 CI A posns. Of these, Bde has proposed to Comd LFCA that the Bde AI be split into three, based upon the Trg Gp

footprint. Selected CI A Dom Ops staff will fall under Bde G3. Two CI B personnel per Trg Gp will staff the CCPLO positions as a secondary duty, augmented by one CI A CCPLO person per Trg Gp.

There are some restrictions inherent in forming Reserve Domestic response Companies. Reservists are volunteers and cannot be forced to serve unless legislated by an Order in Council. Historically this is not a concern, however, the number of personnel available may vary upon the length of employment and the time of year (students). When the units are formed individuals would be required to be put on Class C contracts and be expected to be capable of deploying within a 48 hrs period.

There are no additional vehicles presently available to transport the QRFs outside of their immediate area. We would have to look at commercial transportation. Initially these units would have limited logistical support. (deploy FLG)

Unit preparations:

- fanout drill procedures;
- up-dated contact lists;
- brief soldiers;
- identify required equipment;

Notes:

- no deployment of weapons and/or ammunition, included those for training, unless auth by Comd;
- no ALEA and/or ACP training;
- COs auth to deploy resources in case of immediate threat to human life or impossibility to communicate with higher HQ.

Concept of Support. CSS for domestic operations will be based to the maximum extent possible on existing sustainment systems and infrastructure for close support (CS) and general support (GS). Domestic operations occurring outside of the geographical ability of CFB/ASU to support will be supported by deployed 2 ASG resources providing GS, and limited CS as applicable. Support to either a humanitarian disaster or a domestic disturbance will require different support mechanisms by necessity. All Formations must be aware of the potential limitations of sourcing locally procured items in the event of a humanitarian disaster. 33 CBG will not compete with humanitarian requirements for access to scant local

resources. Deploying forces will be as self-supporting as possible on deployment. All forces will deploy with their own integral support (IS) elements, which will be tailored from both 33 CBG CSS and Cbt Arms Units as required. Once initiated, all CSS for a domestic operation will be coordinated through the G4 33 CBG.

Personnel Service Support (PSS). Particular attention must be paid to the screening of reserve personnel and their availability for deployment. The CDS has directed that in all cases where there is a risk of injury, reservists employed on domestic operations shall be on Class C reserve service.

COMMAND: Comd LFCA retains authority unless:

- Immediate Humanitarian Emergency Situations
- Catastrophic Comms Failure

LFCA's concept of command and control in a large domestic emergency is based on a lead headquarters concept. Initially this lead headquarters will likely be a Reserve bde headquarters and will be charged with the responsibility for:

1. Liaison with regional EMO and OPP;
2. Coordination of local CF resources; and,
3. Limited force generation, namely a Company-sized Domestic Response Company.

As with any military operation, command authority may be re-designated to 2 Bde or retained at LFCAHQ as the scale of the operation evolves.

LFCAHQ remains the HQ through which all coordination with provincial level civil authorities and NDHQ will be conducted.

ENDNOTES

1. In some documents, these personnel are referred to as Community-based Contingency Planning Officers, or CCPO, with the liaison task being assumed.

ANNEX B — GLOSSARY

ACP	Aid of the Civil Power
ALEA	Assistance to Law Enforcement Agencies
CBRN	Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear
CEMC	Community Emergency Management Coordinator
CF	Canadian Forces
CMBG	Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group
CCG	Community Control Group
DCDS	Deputy Chief of Defence Staff
DCDS 2/98	NDHQ Instruction DCDS 2/98, “Guidance for the Conduct of Domestic Operations”
DDDO	DCDS Directions for Domestic Operations
DWC	Domestic Warning Center (American; part of USNORTHCOM)
EOC	Emergency Operations Centre
HAZMAT	Hazardous materials
IAHDO	Inter-Agency Handbook on Domestic Operations
IRC	Immediate Response Component
IRU	Immediate Reaction Unit
JDDO	Joint Doctrine for Domestic Operations
JEPP	Joint Emergency Preparedness Program
JIMP	Joint, Integrated, Multi-agency, Public
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBCD	Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Defence
NDA	National Defence Act
NDCC	National Defence Command Centre

NEC	Nuclear Emergency Commander
NORAD	North American Aerospace Defence Command
NTM	Notice to move
OGD	Other Government Department
POC	Provincial Operations Centre
PSEPC	Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada
ROE	Rules of Engagement
RRC	Reinforcing Response Component
SIBCRA	Sampling and Identification of Biological, Chemical and Radiological Agents
SRC	Sustaining Response Component
TTP	Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
USNORTHCOM	US Northern Command
UN	United Nations

CONTRIBUTORS

Major Robert D. Bradford

Major Bradford is presently a joint doctrine officer in National Defence Headquarters, concurrent with retaining the position of Staff Officer, Expeditionary & Amphibious Warfare at the Canadian Forces Maritime Warfare Centre, Halifax. Major Bradford is an infantry officer with experience in wheeled and tracked mechanised infantry, as well as medium mortars, and has served in Canada, the United States, Germany, and Cyprus. Since 1994, he has been primarily involved in expeditionary and amphibious warfare development. Amongst other courses, he has completed the U.S. Marine Corps' Raider programme (Infantry Company Small Boat) and the Navy-Marine Corps International Senior Officer Amphibious Planning Course at Naval Amphibious Base Coronado, California. Maj Bradford joined NDHQ in December 2002, and is the desk officer for Prisoner-of-War, Conduct-After-Capture, and Domestic Operations products.

Lieutenant-Colonel Shane A. Brennan

Lieutenant-Colonel Brennan graduated from Carleton University in 1983 with a Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Science and enrolled in the Canadian Forces. Upon completion of infantry officer training, he entered the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry. He has served in the 1 and 2 PPCLI, the Canadian Airborne Regiment, Headquarters 1 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group, and on Army staff. A graduate of the Canadian Land Forces Command and Staff College and Canadian Forces Command and Staff College, he has served from platoon commander to battalion commander in operations, and in variety of staff positions. He recently completed a Master of Arts degree in War Studies at the Royal Military College and is currently the Chief of Staff at the Joint Operational Group Headquarters in Kingston.

Mr Dave Clarke

Mr Clarke is the Senior Emergency Management Officer (South Eastern Ontario) for Emergency Management Ontario. Originally from Brockville, Mr Clarke has had a varied background in a number of disciplines. Mr Clarke began his career in the Broadcast industry, spending much of it as a television news anchor. He also served six years on Kingston City Council, including three as City Controller and two terms on Kingston's Police Services Board.

Prior to joining Emergency Management Ontario, Mr Clarke spent nearly 10 years working as an emergency-planning consultant designing various municipal and county emergency plans and exercises. Throughout his career, Mr Clarke has been involved in a variety of emergency situations, including Ice Storm 1998, SARS, the Tyendinega Train derailment, northern Ontario forest fires, the 2003 Blackout and the Peterborough floods.

Major Martin N.P.M. Corriveau

Major Martin Corriveau was commissioned as an Electrical Mechanical Engineering officer in 1993 under the ROTP program, following graduation from the College Militaire Royal de St-Jean in a Space Science degree programme. He has since served with CTC Gagetown, 5 Service Battalion, 3 Royal 22e Regiment, 51 Service Battalion in 34 CBG, Montréal, and as G4 Plans within SQFT. He is a graduate of Canadian Land Force Command and Staff College, and has three operational tours: Haiti (Maint PI Comd), Bosnia-Herzegovina (NSE Ops O), and Afghanistan (NCE G4 Ops). On promotion, Major Corriveau was posted to LFDTS as the SO Training for the Army Lessons Learned Centre and is presently appointed A/Dir ALLC.

Mr Pierre Gagnon

Mr. Gagnon is the Director of Plans and Major Events within the Operations Directorate of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada. He can be contacted at (613) 991-7078, or via email at Pierre.Gagnon@psepc.gc.ca

Brigadier-General T. J. Grant

General Grant graduated from the University of Guelph in 1977 with a Bachelor of Science degree. He has served subsequently as an Armour officer with The 8th Canadian Hussars, The Royal Canadian Dragoons, and Lord Strathcona's Horse (Royal Canadians), a unit he commanded on operations in Bosnia as Roto 1 of SFOR. In addition to serving as an exchange instructor with the Royal Australian Armour School and several postings to NDHQ, General Grant commanded 1 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group. He is a graduate of the Advanced Military Studies Course and the National Security Studies Course. Promoted to Brigadier-General on 29 June 2005, he currently commands Land Force Western Area.

Mr Warren Leonard

Warren Leonard is the Manager of the City of Toronto's Office of Emergency Management. His office is responsible for providing the direction and coordination of the domestic risk assessment, mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery activities within the City of Toronto. Over the past 20 years Mr Leonard has been directly involved in many areas of risk and emergency management including operational response to major emergencies such as the Ice Storm 1998, SARS 2003 and Blackout 2003. Prior to his current position with the City, he spent 17 years with the Toronto Police Service where he was in charge of their Emergency Planning section, responding to hazardous materials incidents, missing person searches, public order, and a host of major special events held in Toronto. Currently he is helping to establish an association of emergency management professionals as a founding Director of the Ontario Association of Emergency Managers. Mr Leonard also served two terms as a Certification Commissioner for the International Association of Emergency Managers. Mr Leonard holds a Master of Science degree from the University of Toronto.

Major Ian C. MacVicar

Major MacVicar holds an Honours BA from Acadia University, an MA in Conflict Analysis and Strategic Studies from the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs Carleton University, and a Master of Defence Studies from RMC. He is an Artillery officer, with Regimental and staff tours in Gagetown, Lahr, Halifax, Petawawa and NDHQ; this, in addition to commanding the Disaster Assistance Response Team during its first operational deployment, for which he was awarded a DCDS Commendation. He has also received a subsequent CDS Commendation. Major MacVicar has attended numerous Russian language and CBRN courses. He has conducted over 50 Arms Control Verification inspections. Major MacVicar served in NDHQ/J3 Continental as the Desk Officer for Domestic Operations Policy, the "9/11 Crisis," G8 Summit and within NDCC during Op GRIZZLY. He assumed his current appointment as the first CO of the CF Joint Nuclear Biological and Chemical Defence (JNBCD) Company on 15 July 2002.

Captain Bob Martyn

Captain Martyn, PhD, presently commands the Hastings & Prince Edward Regiment's Rifle Company. His military career has included service in Combat Arms, Search & Rescue, Intelligence, and the Canadian Airborne Regiment, with operational tours in Cyprus, Bosnia, and Kosovo. Foreign military

qualifications include parachute and diving wings from three continents, in addition to Psychological Operations (UK), Information Operations (US), and Counter-Terrorism Intelligence (US). He recently completed a post-doctoral fellowship within Carleton University's Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, and a Terrorism workshop at William & Mary College in Virginia. He teaches military and security subjects at Queen's University, the Royal Military College, and the Canadian Forces College.

Mr Joseph Moore

Mr Moore is the Supervisor of Community Programs for Emergency Management Ontario, a branch of the Ontario Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services. In this role he provides supervisory and management services to a field staff of 12 officers located strategically across the Province. Prior to coming to EMO, Mr Moore spent 28 years with the Regional Municipality of Peel in Southern Ontario. He retired from Peel in 2002 as General Manager of Ambulance and Emergency Programs, responsible for the Region's EMS, 9-1-1 services and the Emergency Measures Planning program. Mr Moore is the author of several papers related to emergency services and municipal management. He was educated at York University (BA) and the University of Western Ontario (DPA). Mr Moore served five years in the Canadian Army Primary Reserve as a member of the 7th Toronto Regiment, Royal Canadian Artillery and proudly maintains that he is still a gunner at heart.

Colonel Cameron J. Ross

Colonel Ross was born and raised in the village of Richards Landing on St. Joseph Island, near Sault Ste Marie. Joining the CF as an Artillery Officer, he served in Regimental and Staff positions in Shilo, Lahr, and St. Hubert, interspersed with recurring postings to Sault Ste Marie. Upon transferring from the Regular Force to the Reserves in 1998, he was promoted to Lieutenant-Colonel and appointed Commanding Officer of the 49th (Sault Ste Marie) Field Regiment, Royal Canadian Artillery. He then served as Deputy Commander of 33 CBG, with subsequent promotion to Colonel and appointment as the Brigade Commander. Colonel Ross has served on a total of five overseas peacekeeping and enforcement tours, and holds a Bachelor of Military Arts and Science from the Royal Military College in Kingston. His civilian career sees him as Manager and CEO of the Algoma Mutual Insurance Company, located in Thessalon, Ontario.

Major Jerry Walsh

Major Walsh has earned a Bachelor of Social Science (University of Ottawa), Bachelor of Arts, Honours, (Carleton University), and a Master of Arts, Kings College, University of London (England). He is a graduate of the Canadian Land Force Command and Staff Course and the UK Joint Services Command and Staff College (Advanced Command and Staff Course). He has served in numerous command and staff appointments with the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry and with the Canadian Airborne Regiment. His overseas service has included deployments to Cyprus, Somalia and Kosovo. He is currently a member of the DCDS Joint Staff, responsible for domestic and continental operations.